Preference Ambiguity Averse Decision Making Using Robust Optimization and Sensitivity Analysis by Stepanyan, Gevorg




A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Industrial and Systems Engineering)
in the University of Michigan-Dearborn
2021
Doctoral Commitee:
Associate Professor Jian Hu, Chair
Assistant Professor Xi Chen
Assistant Professor Ruiwei Jiang, University of Michigan
Assistant Professor David Kaufman
Professor Armen Zakarian
Table of Contents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
Abstract vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Optimization with Reference-Based Robust Preference Constraints 6
2.1 Introduction 6
2.2 Reference-Based Almost Stochastic Dominance (RSD) 10
2.2.1 Definition of RSD 10
2.2.2 Maximum Dominance Level 12
2.2.3 The Decision Maker’s Desired Dominance Level 14
2.3 Optimization Model Using the RSD 17
2.3.1 RSD Constrained Optimization Model 17
2.3.2 Approximation Using Bernstein Polynomials 18
2.3.3 Relationship Between Models RSD-P and BSD-P 20
2.4 Cut Generation Algorithm for Model BSD-P 21
2.5 Optimization Problem for the Most Robust Preference 23
2.6 Case Study: Portfolio Investment 25
2.6.1 Computational Analysis 27
2.6.2 Effect Analysis of the RSD Constraint 30
2.6.3 Hannah’s Decision 34
2.7 Conclusions 35
ii
Chapter 3 Balance of Preference Maximization and Preference Ambiguity Sen-
sitivity Analysis in Risk-Averse Decision Making 36
3.1 Introduction 36
3.1.1 Balance of Preference Maximization and Sensitivity-Averseness 37
3.1.2 The Sensitivity Measure 39
3.1.3 Literature Review 40
3.1.4 Organization 45
3.2 Sensitivity Measure of Utility (SMU) 45
3.2.1 Properties of SMU 46
3.2.2 Effect of the Reference Utility Function on SMU 48
3.3 Multi-Objective Optimization Model Using SMU 49
3.3.1 Risk-Aversion vs. Sensitivity-Aversion 51
3.3.2 ε-Solution Method 53
3.4 Reformulations of Σ-ESM 56
3.4.1 Assumptions 56
3.4.2 MILP Reformulation for Preference Maximizing Decision Maker 58
3.4.3 LP Reformulation for Risk-Averse Decision Maker 62
3.5 Case Study: Homeland Security Budget Allocation 66
3.5.1 Problem Setup 69
3.5.2 Results of Base Case 72
3.5.3 Impact of Reference Utility Function 76
3.5.4 Impact of the Benchmark 81
3.6 Conclusion 84




Figure 2.1 Computational Results of Algorithm 1 for the Degree of BSD-P
with u1ref and z
Y1 . 28
Figure 2.2 Impact of RSD on Optimal Asset Allocations for Cases (i)-(iv). 31
Figure 2.3 Expected Total Wealths of Cases (i)-(iv). 32
Figure 3.1 Results of Model 1 With Default Parameter Set. 72
Figure 3.2 Impact of Perturbation Size on Optimal Asset Allocations. 74
Figure 3.3 Impact of Inconsistency on Optimal Asset Allocations. 77
Figure 3.4 Results of Model 1 and Model 2 for zGov and zRand Benchmark
Allocations. 83
Figure A.1 Computational Results of Model 1 for zGov Benchmark Allocation. 86
iv
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Dominance Levels of Lottery Tickets 16
Table 2.2 Asset Returns (in %) in (Dentcheva & Ruszczynski, 2003) 27
Table 2.3 Configurations in the Four Studied Cases 27
Table 2.4 Computational Results of Cases (i)-(iv) 29
Table 3.1 Budget Allocation Benchmark 66
Table 3.2 Configurations in Four Studied Cases 71
Table 3.3 Eric’s, Irvin’s and Paula’s Reference Utility Functions 72
Table 3.4 Approximate SMU Levels and Frechet Derivatives on Directions
Pointing to Irvin’s and Paula’s Reference Utility Functions 80
v
Abstract
In this work, we study decision making with personalized stochastic optimization mod-
els. The methods, we propose, develop custom-tailored stochastic optimization models
for a specific decision maker, while preserving the robustness of an optimal decision as
expressions of the decision maker’s attitude towards ambiguity.
We present an optimization model using a novel robust preference relationship —
reference-based almost stochastic dominance (RSD). We use decision maker’s utility func-
tion as a reference to individualize constraints of stochastic dominance. The concept of
RSD addresses the two problems in utility-based decision making: (i) ambiguity and inac-
curacy in characterizing the decision maker’s individual risk attitude, (ii) over-conservativeness
of stochastic dominance representing general properties of risk aversion. The RSD rule re-
veals the maximum dominance level quantifying the robustness of the decision maker’s
preference between alternative choices. We develop an approximation model using Bern-
stein polynomials, show the asymptotic convergence of its optimal value and set of optimal
solutions to the true counterparts as the degree of Bernstein polynomials increases, and ana-
lyze the convergence rate of its feasible region. We next develop a cut-generation algorithm
to solve the approximation model. Finally, we further adapt this cut-generation algorithm
to seek a valid option most robustly preferable to a random benchmark. The effectiveness
and computational complexity of the model are illustrated using a portfolio optimization
problem.
We study the sensitivity of the personalized stochastic optimization models with re-
gards to risk entangled with the decision maker’s ambiguous preference itself. We present
a bi-objective stochastic optimization model —expected utility and sensitivity-averse max-
imization (ESM), incorporating classical risk-aversion and sensitivity analysis with regards
to decision maker’s preference. Unlike classical sensitivity analysis approaches which are
vi
post-analyses after optimization, ESM incorporates sensitivity analysis in the optimization
procedure in terms of the second objective function. It thus allows to produce solutions
which are both risk-averse in the classical sense and sensitivity-averse with regards to am-
biguity in the decision maker’s preference.
ESM adapts the sensitivity measure (SMU) from the general Bayesian sensitivity analy-
sis to build connection between classical expected utility maximization and the sensitivity-
aversion. We develop two solution methods ofESM. A mixed-integer reformulation is given
for a preference maximizer decision maker, while a linear programming reformulation for





Optimization models are common tools used in normative decision theory, which allow
to find the option at least as ”good” as all the others. Applications of such models can be
found in almost any area of industry, including finance (Benidis et al., 2018; Bruni et al.,
2014; Cornuejols & Tutuncu, 2006; Hu et al., 2011; Roman et al., 2013), transportation
(Li et al., 2014; Nie et al., 2011), response systems (Noyan, 2010), energy management
(Gollmer et al., 2008) and others. Classically the ”goodness” of the decision is measured
by its utility from the perspective of given decision maker. This kind of measurement of
the goodness of a decision is commonly refereed as utility theory. It was proposed by
(Bernoulli, 1954) and rigorously defined by (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007) (see
Aase, 2001, for a comprehencive historical review).In (von Neumann & Morgenstern,
2007) does provide the axiomatic foundations of utility theory, proving the existence of
a unique function (named utility function) mapping outcomes to decision maker’s utilities
under the following axioms-
(3:A) Axioms of rationality of the decision maker
(a) Completeness axiom - for any two outcomes X and Y decision maker either
prefers X to Y , or Y to X , or he is indifferent between X and Y .
(b) Transitivity axiom - if a decision maker prefers outcome X to Y , and Y to Z,
then he must prefer the outcome X to Z.
(3:B) Continuity axiom - if a decision maker prefers outcome X to Y , and Y to Z, then
there exists a probability p ∈ [0, 1], for which the decision maker becomes indifferent
between pX + (1− p)Z and Y .
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(3:C) Independence axiom - if a decision maker prefers outcome X to Y , then for any
probability p ∈ [0, 1] and outcome Z, the decision maker still prefers pX +(1− p)Z
to pY + (1− p)Z.
Thus, if the decision maker does satisfy axioms (3:A)-(3:C), in order to solve classical
utility based decision making problem, one only need to assess the decision maker’s utility
function and use it in the optimization model. A large body of research has addressed utility
assessment methods, ranging from preference and/or probability comparison to statistical
regression (Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996, see). Initially it was thought that it
is not possible to precisely identify decision makers utility function, because of technical
difficulties related to assessment methods. However, over the years a large body of studies
from psychology and descriptive decision making indicate that (3:A)-(3:C) axioms rarely
describe real decision makers’ preferences (see Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; Samson, 1988;
Thurstone, 1994, and others in references). Based on the results of these studies we iden-
tify following challenges in decision making when working with decision maker’s utility
functions (These challenges were also indicated in Samson, 1988):
(Chl 1) Assessed utility function may be imprecise, because
(a) all assessment methods can construct it using only a finite amount of ques-
tionnaire answers of decision maker (Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe,
1996),
(b) decision makers tend to simplify complex questions, resulting in answers
uncharacteristic to them (H. Simon, 1955; Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1981).
(Chl 2) It may not be possible to construct one function to describe decision maker’s pref-
erence at all, because decision maker’s preferences may be mutable and ambiva-
lent (Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; Dean & Martin, 2016; Echenique et al., 2011).
Ambiguities in the decision maker’s utility function arising from the problem (Chl 1.a)
are well known, but are considered relatively easy to solve when detected. Usually by in-
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creasing the number (to solve problem (Chl 1.a)) and reducing complexity (to solve prob-
lem (Chl 1.b)) of questions in the questionnaires designed for the utility function assess-
ment.
On the other hand, problem (Chl 2) (and in some sense (Chl 1.b)) is risen because of
decision maker himself. These problems usually are detected when the decision maker is
tested to satisfy the (3:A:a) completeness and (3:A:b) transitivity axioms. These axioms
require for the decision maker to present consistent choice behavior. Unfortunately this
assumptions have a lot of contradictions with reality. Starting from mid 1950s it was il-
lustrated that under complex, uncertain environment decision makers violate this choice
consistency assumption (H. A. Simon, 1956; Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
This studies lead to assumption that decision makers represent such inconsistent (hetero-
geneous) behavior due to limitations in their mental capacity and that in general a rational
decision makers still shall have consistent preferences.
However, starting from mid 2000s, this assumption was shown to be wrong as well.
The subjects were shown to change their minds in simple choice problems (Agranov &
Ortoleva, 2017; Dean & Martin, 2016; Echenique et al., 2011). In their study of preference
consistency Agranov & Ortoleva (2017) indicate that when given simple questions 3 times
in a row 23% of participants had switching answers. Additionally they show that 94% of
all participants have preference inconsistencies somewhere in their choices, indicating that
the inconsistencies in decision maker’s preference cannot be disregarded as white noise and
must be considered when using utility functions to describe a real decision makers.
Thus, we conclude that in majority of utilitarian decision making frameworks chal-
lenges (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) can induce ambiguity around the assessed utility function of the
decision maker. In this work we define this ambiguity as follows-
Preference ambiguity is the inevitable imprecision in decision maker’s utility function,
caused by challenges (Chl 1) and (Chl 2).
It is obvious that the results of optimal decision making model can be sensitive to the
preference ambiguity. Studies identifying it can be found in market analysis (Dean & Mar-
tin, 2016; Echenique et al., 2011), in health care (Chapman & Elstein, 2013; Stalmeier et
al., 2001, 1997), in portfolio optimization (Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; Echenique et al.,
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2011; Hu et al., 2011), and in others. In the chapter 3 we present detailed survey of the de-
cision making studies, where the solutions of theoretical and real world problems expressed
sensitivity with regards to the preference ambiguity. This dissertation is dedicated to study
the preference ambiguity in the utility theory of decision making, and to present methods
to solve the sensitivity problems it may cause. The rest of the dissertation is organized as
follows.
In the chapter 2 we review one of the most used techniques in the utility theory- ro-
bust optimization with stochastic optimization constraints. Introduced by (Dentcheva &
Ruszczynski, 2003), this models exhibit preference ambiguity averse properties for the de-
cision making problems under uncertainty in the outcomes. Due to its construction, the
classical optimization model with stochastic dominance constraints requires the solution
to be preferable for all hypothetically possible decision makers sharing a specific risk atti-
tude. Unfortunately, it also includes some extreme utility functions rarely characterizing a
human decision maker’s preference.
In this section we construct a new type of stochastic relationship reference-based almost
stochastic dominance (RSD). The concept of RSD addresses the two problems in utility-
based decision making:
(i) ambiguity and inaccuracy in characterizing the decision maker’s individual risk atti-
tude,
(ii) over-conservativeness of stochastic dominance representing general properties of risk
aversion.
The RSD rule reveals the maximum dominance level quantifying the robustness of the de-
cision maker’s preference between alternative choices. We first develop an approximation
model using Bernstein polynomials, show the asymptotic convergence of its optimal value
and set of optimal solutions to the true counterparts as the degree of Bernstein polynomi-
als increases, and analyze the convergence rate of its feasible region. We next develop a
cut-generation algorithm to solve the approximation model. Finally, we further adapt this
cut-generation algorithm to seek a valid option most robustly preferable to a random bench-
mark. The effectiveness and computational complexity of the model have been illustrated
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using a portfolio optimization problem.
In the chapter 3 we study the sensitivity of the solutions of decision making mod-
els with regards to preference ambiguity. We propose a novel bi-objective optimization
model incorporating preference maximization and sensitivity analysis on decision maker’s
preference ambiguity (ESM). The concept of (ESM) addresses the preference ambigu-
ity and inaccuracy in characterizing the decision maker’s individual risk attitude. Unlike
classical approaches, the (ESM) does sensitivity analysis in the optimization step. Which
allows optimal solutions to be both risk-averse with regards to outcome uncertainty and
sensitivity-averse with regards to decision maker’s preference ambiguity. We first study
special (SMU) sensitivity measure properties. Based on which, construct two linearizion
reformulations of (ESM). The first reformulation is for preference maximizer decision
makers. It is a mixed-integer, bi-objective optimization model. The second reformulation
is for risk-averse decision makers. In this case the bi-objective optimization model is linear.
Finally, we apply the (ESM) model for the budget allocation to ten major urban areas in
the United States under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). We study the various
solutions of the problem for different decision makers. Compare their allocation policies to
the government’s average allocation and to the allocation suggested by RAND corporation.
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Chapter 2
Optimization with Reference-Based Robust Preference Constraints
2.1 Introduction
Extensive research has addressed utility assessment methods using preference compar-
ison, probability equivalence, value equivalence, certainty equivalence, and statistical re-
gression (Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996). However, typically it is not possible
to specify the decision maker’s preference precisely and this preference ambiguity due to
a lack of accurate description of human behavior is a basic assumption and concern in the
random utility theory (Thurstone, 1994). In the literature, this ambiguity is caused by two
major challenges in realistic applications: (Chl 1) technical and (Chl 2) inherit (Chajewska
& Koller, 2000; Karmarkar, 1978; Savage, 2012; Thurstone, 1994; Weber & Borcherding,
1993).
Stochastic dominance is an alternative stochastic ordering approach (Bawa, 1975; Hadar
& Russell, 1969; Hanoch & Levy, 1975; Müller & Stoyan, 2002; Shaked & Shanthikumar,
1994). Consider two random variables X, Y ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) with the support Θ := [θ, θ].
X stochastically dominates Y in the mth order if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for any utility func-
tion u satisfying (−1)k−1u(k)(x) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,m, for all x ∈ Θ (Brockett & Golden,
1987; Levy, 2016). This utility class represents basic properties of risk aversion. For ex-
ample, the decision maker prefers more to less if u′(x) ≥ 0, is risk averse if u′′(x) ≤ 0,
and becomes prudent if u′′′(x) ≥ 0 on Θ. The use of stochastic dominance to compare al-
ternatives avoids the ambiguity in assessing the decision maker’s specific utility. However,
stochastic dominance based preference is often unnecessarily over-conservative (Hu et al.,
2014; Leshno & Levy, 2002; Lizyayev & Ruszczyński, 2012). We consider the following
example analogous to one given in (Levy, 2016). Suppose that Hannah wants to invest in
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one of the following lottery tickets priced at $1:
• X̄1: yielding $0 with the probability of 1% and $2 with the probability of 99%,
• Ȳ1: yielding $0.01 (1 penny) with certainty.
Although X̄1 is much more preferred by the rational decision maker to Ȳ1, stochastic dom-
inance does not support the preference of X̄1 over Ȳ1. In this case, the support Θ = [0, 2],
where θ = 0 means that Hannah loses all investment and θ = 2 shows that Hannah gains
100% profit. Let Hannah’s utilities at $0 and $2 be 0 and 1, respectively. It can be seen
that, for the utility function ũ(x) := 1000
√
x/2, we have that E[ũ(X̄1)] ≤ E[ũ(Ȳ1)]. Since
ũ is infinitely differentiable in Θ (ũ′(0) = ∞ is allowed) and has the derivatives with al-
ternating signs regarding the degrees of the derivatives, ũ belongs to the utility class of
any order stochastic dominance. The risk characterization specified by ũ overvalues very
small gains, but completely neglects the possible difference in large gains (ũ(x) has a very
stiff increase for a small x, while being flat for a large x). Such behavior is quite unnatu-
ral; however, stochastic dominance requires that the preference should hold for all suitable
utility functions including ũ.
This study proposes a novel robust preference relationship — reference-based almost
stochastic dominance (RSD) — to resolve the problems of both the ambiguity in charac-
terizing the decision maker’s individual risk preference and the over-conservativeness of
stochastic dominance representing the generality of risk-aversion. These two problems
have been studied separately in the literature. Leshno and Levy (Leshno & Levy, 2002),
Lizyayev and Ruszczyǹski (Lizyayev & Ruszczyński, 2012), and Hu et al. (Hu et al., 2014)
relaxed the distributionally defined forms of the first and second order stochastic domi-
nance. Leshno and Levy (Leshno & Levy, 2002) imposed relatively boundary restrictions
on the derivatives of utility functions for eliminating extreme cases (e.g. ũ). The relax-
ations proposed in (Hu et al., 2014; Lizyayev & Ruszczyński, 2012) use error tolerance in
comparison with the expected utility values of lotteries rather than specify restrictions on
utility functions. Working on the CVaR based interpretation of the second order stochastic
dominance, Noyan and Rudolf (Noyan & Rudolf, 2013) proposed the relaxed stochastic
ordering which requires the CVaR of the preferred random variable to be larger over a
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shrunk set of confidence levels. These approaches do not comply with the decision maker’s
individual risk preference, while resolving the problem of the over-conservativeness of
stochastic dominance. Armbruster and Delage (Armbruster & Delage, 2015), and Hu and
Mehrotra (Hu & Mehrotra, 2014) developed robust expected utility maximization models
which consider individualizing the set of utility functions to meet the decision maker’s
risk attitude. Armbruster and Delage (Armbruster & Delage, 2015) used the paired game
method where the decision maker’s risk attitude is partially characterized by her pairwise
preference of designed lotteries. Hu and Mehrotra (Hu & Mehrotra, 2014) specified bound-
ary conditions on utility and marginal utility functions using parametric utility assessments,
and construct auxiliary conditions using both standard and paired game methods. Our ap-
proach, differently, is to construct a perturbation neighborhood around the reference utility
function assessed to characterize the decision maker’s risk attitude. The size of the pertur-
bation neighborhood quantifies the level of the ambiguity in the assessment, which are not
addressed by Armbruster and Delage (Armbruster & Delage, 2015) and Hu and Mehrotra
(Hu & Mehrotra, 2014).
We address optimization problems with the RSD constraint. Dentcheva and
Ruszczyński (Dentcheva & Ruszczynski, 2003, 2004) first introduced stochastic domi-
nance constrained optimization problems, which pursue expected profit while hedging risk
by choosing options preferable to a random benchmark. Since the last decade, optimiza-
tion models using stochastic dominance have been the subject of theoretical considerations
and practical applications in areas such as business, finance, energy and transportation,
e.g. (Dentcheva et al., 2007; Dentcheva & Ruszczyński, 2006; Drapkin & Schultz, 2010;
Haskell & Jain, 2015; Hu et al., 2010; Karoui & Meziou, 2006; Lean et al., 2010; Luedtke,
2008; Nie et al., 2011; Roman et al., 2006; Sun & Xu, 2013).
Our model uses the concept of functional robustness. We specify a nonparametric
shape-preserving neighborhood of the decision maker’s reference utility function. This
specification is suitable for classical nonparametric standard gamble methods and paired
gamble methods such as preference comparison, probability equivalence, value equiva-
lence, and certainty equivalence ((Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996), and refer-
ence therein). The concept of functionally robust optimization was first proposed by Hu
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et al. (Hu et al., 2019) in a news vendor problem for the unknown mathematical form of
a price-demand function, which is different from traditional robust approaches requiring
the knowledge of the functional form, e.g. (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 1998; Bertsimas et al.,
2010, 2004; Delage & Ye, 2010; el Ghaoui & Lebret, 1997; Scarf, 1958; Shapiro & Ahmed,
2004). To specify the uncertainty set of the price-demand function, Hu et al. (Hu et al.,
2019) considered an error allowance for the least-squares fitting at discrete data points. We
generalize their approach to introduce an L2-norm based tolerance of perturbation around
the reference utility function. In the context of stochastic dominance, this tolerance is in-
terpreted as the decision maker’s desired dominance level.
We develop an approximate solution method using Bernstein polynomials. Bernstein
polynomial based approximation is one of broadly-applied interpolation and curve fitting
techniques in engineering computation (Ditzian, 1989; Lorentz, 2012; Ray, 2018; Rivlin,
2010). The optimal value and the set of optimal solutions of the approximation model
asymptotically converge to the true counterparts as the degree n of Bernstein polynomials
increases. It is also shown that the feasible region of the approximation model converges
with a rate n−1/2. Finally, a cut-generation algorithm is developed to solve the approxi-
mation model. In addition, we further adapt this cut-generation algorithm to seek a valid
option most robustly preferable to a random benchmark.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we define RSD, and use the ex-
amples of Hannah’s comparing lotteries to illustrate the maximum and desired dominance
levels. Section 2.3 develops an optimization model with the RSD constrain, and discusses
its approximation using Bernstein polynomials. We study the convergence rate of the ap-
proximate feasible region, and analyze the asymptotic convergence of the optimal value
and the set of optimal solutions in the approximation approach. In Section 2.4 we de-
velop a cut-generation algorithm to solve the approximation model. Section 2.5 adapts this
cut-generation algorithm to seek a valid option most robustly preferable to a random bench-
mark. The effect of the RSD constraint and the complexity of the algorithm are illustrated
in Section 2.6 by using the financial portfolio optimization problem given in (Dentcheva &
Ruszczynski, 2003). Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Reference-Based Almost Stochastic Dominance (RSD)
In this section we first give the definition of RSD, and next discuss the robust level of
preference based on the concept of RSD.
2.2.1 Definition of RSD
The concept of RSD is specified as a preference relationship based on the neighbor-
hood of the decision maker’s reference utility function. For the risk averse decision maker,
utility functions should be increasing and concave. Without loss of generality, assume that
the reference utility function, denote by uref , is increasing and concave on Θ, and satis-
fies uref (θ) = 0 and uref (θ) = 1. In practice, uref could be assessed in any classical
parametric or non-parametric approach surveyed in (Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe,
1996), such as preference comparison, probability equivalence, value equivalence, certainty
equivalence, statistical regression, etc.
DEFINITION 1. For the reference utility function uref which is increasing and concave
on Θ and satisfies uref (θ) = 0 and uref (θ) = 1, a random variable X ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) is
preferred to another random variable Y ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) in the mth (m ≥ 2) order reference-
based almost stochastic dominance (RSD) for a given ε ∈ [0, 1] (written as X ε(m) Y w.r.t.
uref ), if
E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )],
for any utility function u satisfying
(A1). for any x ∈ Θ, (−1)i−1u(i)(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
(A2). u(θ) = uref (θ) = 0, and u(θ) = uref (θ) = 1,





for a given nonnegative
measure μ with μ(Θ) = 1,
(A4). for any x ∈ Θ, u(x) ≤ M
1−εuref (x), for a fixed M > 1 (if ε = 1, then u(x) < ∞).
Condition (A1) represents the utility class required by the mth order stochastic domi-
nance to describe the basic properties of risk aversion. Condition (A2) is the normalization
of utility functions which preserves preference rankings (Theorem 4.1 in (Keeney & Raiffa,
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1993)). Condition (A3) generates a neighborhood around the reference uref . This neigh-
borhood is a closed ball, with the radius ε, on the L2-normed space with the measure μ
on Θ. The L2 norm, as the fundamental metric in least-squares methods, is the widely
used to measure estimation errors and perturbation tolerance, particularly in the fields of
statistical regression, model fitting, and perturbation analysis. Condition (A4) provides a
uniform bound on the moduli of continuity of utility functions. For δ > 0, the modulus of
continuity of u is denoted as
ω(δ) := sup
x1, x2 ∈ Θ
|x1 − x2| ≤ δ
|u(x1)− u(x2)|. (2.1)
By conditions (A1), (A2), and (A4), we have that
ω(δ) = u(θ + δ)− u(θ) = u(θ + δ) ≤ M
1− εuref (θ + δ)
=
M
1− ε(uref (θ + δ)− uref (θ)) =
M
1− εωref (δ), (2.2)
where ωref is the modulus of continuity of uref . It requires that the changes of utility
values over any small interval vary in a reasonable range decided by ωref and the constant
M/(1− ε).
Note that under conditions (A1) and (A2), if ε = 1, conditions (A3) and (A4) be-
come redundant, and RSD represents stochastic dominance. On the other hand, if uref
satisfies condition (A1), it is a unique utility function satisfying conditions (A3) and (A4)
when ε = 0. RSD in this case is the preference under the characterization of the deci-
sion maker’s individual risk attitude. In comparison, an ε in (0, 1) balances the individual
characterization and general representation of risk aversion. This balance excludes utility
functions very different from uref from the general risk averse utility classes to weaken the
over-conservativeness of stochastic dominance, while it uses the perturbation allowance to
resolve the problem of the ambiguity of the individual characterization. In Sections 2.2.2
and 2.2.3, we further interpret ε by introducing a concept of maximum dominance level
and discussing the decision maker’s desired dominance level.
The measure μ in condition (A3) is used to quantify the relative importance of different
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subintervals of Θ. In a special case μ is a discrete measure, and condition (A3) is the
weighted least squares fitting criterion. Actually, nonparametric utility assessments can
only generate finitely many utility value points, and then use a piecewise linear curve to link
all these points. We may specify a perturbation set based on those discrete points instead of
the piecewise linear curve. Let (xi, uref (xi)), i = 1, . . . , I , be the reference utility points.








Um(ε) := {u : u(x) satisfies conditions (A1)-(A4) for given ε}. (2.4)
By Definition 1, X ε(m) Y, w.r.t. uref is equivalent to E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )], ∀u ∈ Um(ε).
The following propositions show the relation between different orders of RSD, and claim
the non emptiness and convexity of the set U(ε).
PROPOSITION 1. If X ε(m) Y, w.r.t. uref , then X ε(m+1) Y, w.r.t. uref .
PROPOSITION 2. Um(ε) is a convex set. If uref satisfies condition (A1), then U
m(ε) is
nonempty.
2.2.2 Maximum Dominance Level
RSD balances the individual characterization and general representation of risk aversion
for an appropriate ε. To further interpret ε, we need to define the maximum dominance level
as follows
DEFINITION 2. For two random variables X, Y ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) satisfying
E[uref (X)] ≥ E[uref (Y )], the maximum level of X almost dominating Y in the mth order
w.r.t uref is
E (m)(X, Y ; uref ) := sup {ε ∈ [0, 1] : X ε(m) Y w.r.t. uref}. (2.5)
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The maximum dominance level E (m)(X, Y ; uref ) quantifies how robustly X is pre-
ferred to Y under uref . In conditions (A3) and (A4), ε is the allowed tolerance of the
perturbation around uref defined using the L2-norm metric and the bound on the modulus
of continuity. The maximum dominance level is the largest tolerance of perturbation un-
der which the preference of X over Y holds, and this tolerance indicates the robust level
of the preference. Note that X stochastically dominates Y in the mth order if and only if
E (m)(X, Y ; uref ) = 1. Moreover, this measure of preference robustness only relies on uref ,
and is consistent in comparing different lotteries. For example, for two pairs (X, Y ) and
(R, S), if E (m)(X, Y ; uref ) > E (m)(R, S; uref ), it means that the preference of X over Y
holds under a larger tolerance of perturbation around uref . That is, for the given uref , the
preference of X over Y is more robust than that of R over S. In the following example, we
discuss the maximum dominance level of Hannah’s purchasing lottery.
EXAMPLE 1. Maximum dominance level of Hannah’s purchasing lottery.
We now illustrate the maximum dominance level using the case of Hannah’s purchasing
lottery tickets X̄1 and Ȳ1. It has been shown that stochastic dominance is unable to reveal
the preference of X̄1 over Ȳ1, for conservatively taking unreasonable utility functions (e.g.
ũ given in the introduction) into consideration. Now suppose that Hannah’s risk preference
is approximately characterized as ūref (x) =
√
x/2, which we use as the reference utility
function. The maximum dominance level E (2)(X̄1, Ȳ1; ūref ) = 0.398. Hence, with the
given ε ≤ 0.398, we have that X̄1 ε(2) Ȳ1, w.r.t. ūref , and condition (A3) excludes utility
functions that Hannah is unwilling to choose (e.g. ũ). To understand the statement that the
maximum dominance level quantifies the preference level in the sense of robustness, we
denote by Ȳ$1 the non-purchase option that Hannah does not purchase any lottery ticket.
This option is equivalent to purchasing the lottery of which the ticket is priced $1 and
the return is also $1 certainly. Hence, Hannah has no gain but never takes a risk. The
rational decision maker does not purchase Ȳ1 on which the investment is lost for sure. This
undoubted fact is supported by E (2)(Ȳ$1, Ȳ1; ūref ) = 1, which indicates Ȳ$1 stochastically
dominates Ȳ1. So we can claim that Hannah absolutely prefers Ȳ$1 to Ȳ1. In contrast,
although X̄1 could be better than Ȳ$1 (E[ūref (X̄1)] = 0.99 > ūref (Ȳ$1) = 0.707), we
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cannot say that X̄1 is absolutely preferred to Ȳ1 according to stochastic dominance rules.
Indeed, there is still a theoretical possibility that Ȳ1 is preferred to X̄1. It can only be said
that the preference of X̄1 over Ȳ1 reaches the level E (2)(X̄1, Ȳ1; ūref ) of robustness. We
also consider an additional $1 lottery ticket as
• X̄2: yielding $0 with the probability of 10% and $2 with the probability of 90%,
While X̄1 stochastically dominates X̄2, X̄2 is still more attractive then Ȳ1. This preference
is visible also from E (2)(X̄2, Ȳ1; ūref ) = 0.069. Comparing the two pairs (X̄1, Ȳ1) and
(X̄2, Ȳ1), we have that E (2)(X̄1, Ȳ1; ūref ) > E (2)(X̄2, Ȳ1; ūref ). These results show that X̄1
is more robustly preferred to Ȳ1 than X̄2. 
2.2.3 The Decision Maker’s Desired Dominance Level
The concept of the maximum dominance level quantifies the largest tolerance of per-
turbation, under which a preference holds, around the reference utility function uref . We
interpret ε in conditions (A3) and (A4) as the decision maker’s desired dominance level
which is her accepted largest tolerance of perturbation around uref . This desired domi-
nance level is also interpreted as the unique robust level of the decision maker’s preference
with which she can assert a lottery is sufficiently preferred to another in the sense that the
ambiguity and inconsistency in the elicitation of uref is not very sensitive.
A principle in utility theory is that the decision maker’s risk attitude does not vary in lot-
tery comparisons. Utility functions, excluded in a lottery comparison for not representing
the decision maker’s risk attitude, should be also excluded in any other lottery comparison.
Hence, her desired dominance level is solely related to her reference utility function. This
property allows us to adapt the probability equivalence method, one of classical utility as-
sessment approaches (Farquhar, 1984; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996), to evaluate the decision
maker’s desired dominance level. Denote by X(p) the lottery which yields θ with the prob-
ability 1−p and θ with the probability p, and let ϑ1, . . . , ϑK be selected deterministic points
in Θ. The traditional probability equivalence method asks the decision maker to decide an
exact pk such that X(pk) is equivalent to ϑk for each k = 1, . . . , K, i.e., the expected util-
ity of X(pk) equals the utility of ϑk. However, it could be difficult to give this exact pk.
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means that, in her belief, X(p) is sufficiently better than ϑk if p ≥ pk, and worse if p ≤ pk.
Note that
E[uref (X(pk))] ≤ uref (ϑk) ≤ E[uref (X(pk))]. (2.6)
for uref characterizes her individual risk attitude. The decision maker’s desired dominance
level is estimated by both
εk := E (m)(ϑk, X(pk); uref ), and εk := E
(m)(X(pk), ϑk; uref ). (2.7)
Therefore, we hypothetically have that
ε1 = ε1 = · · · = εK = εK . (2.8)
However in practice, the decision maker could give inconsistent estimates. In this case, we
choose the average, 1
2K
∑K
k=1 (εk + εk), as the overall estimate of the desired dominance
level.







probability equivalence method, we design a simple “best-to-worst” lottery table (e.g. Ta-
ble 2.1) to assist the decision maker in her choice. This table lists X(p) for some discrete
points of p and their maximum dominance levels with respect to ϑk. Example 2 addresses
the estimation of Hannah’s desired dominance level.
EXAMPLE 2. Estimation of Hannah’s desired dominance level.
We illustrate the estimation of Hannah’s desired dominance level. Choose ϑ1 = $0.5,
ϑ2 = $1, and ϑ3 = $1.5 to equally partition her interested region Θ = [0, 2], and compare
these points and the lottery ticket X(p) which in this case is priced at $1, and yields $0 with
the probability 1− p and $2 with the probability p. Note that ϑ2 is the non-purchase option
Ȳ$1 of which the ticket is priced $1 and the return is also $1 certainly. In what follows we
discuss the comparison between X(p) and ϑ2 as an example.
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Table 2.1: Dominance Levels of Lottery Tickets
Lottery Probability of Yield Maximum Dominance Level
Ticket $0 $2 E (2)(X̄i, ϑ2; ūref ) E (2)(ϑ2, X̄i; ūref )
X̄1 1% 99% 0.122 —
X̄2 10% 90% 0.069 —
X̄3 15% 85% 0.045 —
X̄4 20% 80% 0.024 —
X̄5 25% 75% 0.007 —
X̄6 30% 70% — 0.001
X̄7 35% 65% — 0.014
X̄8 40% 60% — 0.034
X̄9 45% 55% — 0.057
Table 2.1 gives lottery tickets X̄i, for i = 1, . . . , 9, which are X(p) at selected discrete
points. Since E[ūref (X̄i)] > ūref (ϑ2), i = 1, . . . , 5, E (2)(ϑ2, X̄i; ūref ) do not exist. Anal-
ogously, it is the same for E (2)(X̄i, ϑ2; ūref ), i = 6, . . . , 9. Since X̄i stochastically dom-
inates X̄i+1, the preference of X̄i is monotonously weakened such that E (2)(X̄i, ϑ2; ūref )
decreases, and E (2)(ϑ2, X̄i; ūref ) increases. Hannah is requested to select the lottery tickets
from the list which she is not reluctant to purchase or must not purchase. Since ϑ2 is a
non-yielding but risk-free option, Hannah’s choice indicates the level of her insistence on
risky investment. Suppose that she picks first three lotteries unhesitatingly, and decides not
to purchase the last two. But she feels it difficult to make a decision on X̄4 and X̄7. Then
her choices on the upside and downside yield two estimates of her desired dominance level,
which are ε2 = E (2)(X̄3, ϑ2; ūref ) = 0.045 and ε2 = E (2)(ϑ2, X̄8; ūref ) = 0.034. In other
words, she would like to invest in the lottery ticket that almost dominates the non-purchase
option with the maximum level no less than 0.045, and not to purchase ones that are almost
dominated with the maximum level no less than 0.034.
To simplify the discussion, we assume that ε1 = ε2 = ε3 and ε1 = ε2 = ε3 without loss
of generality. Hannah’s desired dominance is estimated to be (0.045 + 0.034)/2 = 0.040.
Hannah’s decision is that X̄1, X̄2, X̄3 are sufficiently preferred to ϑ2 in the 2nd order RSD,
while X̄4 and X̄5 may be indifferent. She also thinks that X̄9 is obviously worse than ϑ2,
and X̄6, X̄7 are worth to carefully consider. A special case is X̄8. Although Hannah prefers
ϑ2 to X̄8, ϑ2 and X̄8 are indifferent under RSD with the estimated dominance level. This
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disagreement is ascribed to not only the inconsistency of the decision maker’s describing
her preference in different lottery comparisons, but also the estimation error coming from
the discretization of the probability in Table 2.1.
Conditions (A3) and (A4) with Hannah’s desired dominance level ε = 0.040 exclude
utility functions which are too different from her reference utility function ūref to represent
her risk attitude possibly. For example, ũ(x) = 1000
√
x/2 in the introduction is an irrational
utility function for Hannah since ‖ũ− ūref‖L2 = 0.56 is larger than her desired dominance
level 0.040. It is worth to mention that stochastic dominance and Leshno and Levy’s almost
stochastic dominance in (Leshno & Levy, 2002) do not exclude a risk neutral (linear) utility
function. It means that X cannot dominate Y if E[X] < E[Y ]. However, for the risk averse
decision maker, the risk neutral utility function may be an extreme, and unable to represent
her risk averse risk attitude. Hence, by choosing a suitable ε, condition (A3) is able to
exclude the risk neutral utility function. In the Hannah example, ū(x) := x/2 is the risk
neutral utility function, and its L2-norm based distance from ūref is ‖ū− ūref‖L2 = 0.167.
Since Hannah’s desire dominance level is 0.040, ū is not included in the utility set specified
by conditions (A1)-(A4) of RSD. In Table 2.1 E[X̄i] > E[ϑ2] for i = 6, . . . , 9. Hannah’s
decision on not purchasing X̄9 implies that the risk neutral utility function conflicts with
her risk attitude. 
2.3 Optimization Model Using the Reference-Based Almost Stochastic Dominance
In this section we first represent a RSD constrained stochastic optimization model, and
next study an approximation approach to the RSD constrained model using Bernstein poly-
nomials. Finally, we discuss the connection of the RSD constrained model with its approx-
imation, and show the asymptotic convergence of the approximation.
2.3.1 RSD Constrained Optimization Model
A stochastic optimization model using the mth (m ≥ 2) order RSD as a risk averse




subject to X(z) ε(m) Y, w.r.t. uref ,
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z ∈ Z,
where Z ⊆ Rd is a decision region, f : Rd 
→ R is an objective function, X : Z 
→
(Ω,F , P ; Θ) represents a random outcome function of the decision, and Y ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ)
is a benchmark. In RSD-P, the RSD constraint requires that the random outcome X(z) at a
valid decision z should almost dominate the random benchmark Y in the mth order for the
given dominance level ε with respect to the reference utility function uref .
We now state notations needed in the discussion. Denote
πm(z) := min
u∈Um(ε)
{Π(z, u) := E[u(X(z))− u(Y )]} , (2.9)
and
Ψm(δ) := {z ∈ Z : πm(z) ≥ δ}. (2.10)
By Definition 1, the RSD constraint in RSD-P equals to πm(z) ≥ 0. Hence, Ψm(0) is the
feasible region of RSD-P. By Proposition 1, we have the following relationship of the set
Ψm(δ) for different m’s.
PROPOSITION 3. For any δ ∈ R, Ψm(δ) ⊆ Ψm+1(δ).
2.3.2 Approximation Using Bernstein Polynomials
Model RSD-P is a functionally robust optimization problem, where the RSD constraint
is specified using the set Um(ε) of nonparametric utility functions. We now discuss an ap-
proximate solution method of RSD-P using Bernstein polynomials. Bernstein polynomial
based approximation is one of broadly-applied interpolation and curve fitting techniques
in engineering computation (Ditzian, 1989; Lorentz, 2012; Ray, 2018; Rivlin, 2010). In
our approach, Bernstein polynomials preserve the geometry of risk aversion (condition
(A1)) that utility functions in Um(ε) are m times differentiable, and have the derivatives
with alternating signs, regarding the degrees of the derivatives. Meanwhile, the behavior
of Bernstein polynomials at boundary points tallies with the normalization of utility func-
tion (condition (A2)), and their uniform convergence property satisfies the requirements on
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the perturbation level (condition (A3)) and the uniformly bounded modulus of continuity
(condition (A4)).











, j = 0, . . . , n, (2.11)
are the bases of Bernstein polynomial on Θ. The nth degree Bernstein polynomial is given
as
Bn(x; c) := c
Tφ(x), x ∈ Θ, (2.12)
where c := (c0, . . . , cn)
T is a vector of coefficients. Note that condition (A1) requires
utility functions to be m times differentiable. In order to avoid trivial solutions, we require
that n ≥ m. Consider the following conditions on coefficients c = (c0, . . . , cn)T :








(B2). c0 = uref (θ) = 0, and cn = uref (θ) = 1,












(B4). cj ≤ min
{
1, M





, j = 0 . . . n.
Denote the set of coefficient by
Cmn (ε) := {c ∈ Rn+1 : c satisfies conditions (B1)-(B4)}. (2.13)
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The theorem below states that Um(ε) contains the set of Bernstein polynomials with the
coefficients belonging to Cmn (ε).
THEOREM 1. Let Bmn (ε) := {Bn(x; c) : c ∈ Cmn (ε)}. Bmn (ε) ⊆ Um(ε).
Theorem 1 shows that a Bernstein polynomial Bn(x; c) belongs to U
m
n (ε) if its coeffi-
cient c satisfies conditions (B1) - (B4). On the other hand, if Bn(x; c) ∈ Umn (ε), c must
obey by conditions (B1) - (B3), but may not satisfy condition (B4). Letting
πmn (z) := min
c∈Cmn (ε)
{Πn(z, c) := E[Bn(X(z), c)− Bn(Y, c)]} , (2.14)
we now present an approximation of the RSD constraint using Bernstein polynomials as
πmn (z) ≥ 0. (BSD)
Similarly, the set Ψm(δ) and RSD-P are approximated as





The degree n of Bernstein polynomials is an important parameter of the approximation
BSD-P. The next section will discuss the asymptotic convergence of BSD-P to RSD-P as
n increases to infinity and its convergence rate. Hence, we call n the degree of BSD-P.
2.3.3 Relationship Between Models RSD-P and BSD-P
We now discuss the connection between RSD-P and its approximation BSD-P. Two
theorems are given below to analyze the asymptotic convergence of BSD-P and its con-
vergence rate. Theorem 2 describes that the feasible region of BSD-P converges to that
of RSD-P with a rate n−1/2 (n is the degree of BSD-P). Theorem 3 shows the asymptotic
convergence of the optimal value and the set of optimal solutions of BSD-P.
20
THEOREM 2. Suppose uref ∈ Um(ε). For any δ ∈ (0, 1), choose the degree n of
BSD-P such that













Ψmn (δ) ⊆ Ψm(0) ⊆ Ψmn (0) ⊆ Ψm(−δ). (2.17)
REMARK 1. Theorem 2 gives a required n to reach the desired accuracy of the feasible
region Ψmn (0) of BSD-P. That is, Ψ
m(0) ⊆ Ψmn (0) ⊆ Ψm(−Λ(n)). By the Taylor-series



















This shows that the convergence rate of Ψmn (0) is n
−1/2. 
We now discuss the asymptotic convergence of the optimal value and the set of optimal
solutions of the approximation BSD-P.
THEOREM 3. Let ξm and Ξm be the optimal value and the set of optimal solutions of
RSD-P, ξmn and Ξ
m
n be the optimal value and the set of optimal solutions of BSD-P with
degree n. Suppose that (i) uref ∈ Um(ε), (ii) the set Z is convex and compact, (iii) the
random function X(z) is concave in Z, (iv) there exists an interior point z̃ ∈ Z such that
π(z̃) ≥ 0, and (v) the objective function f is continuous in Ψm(0), then ξmn → ξm and
D(Ξmn ,Ξ
m) := maxx∈Ξmn miny∈Ξm ‖x− y‖∞ → 0 as n → ∞.
2.4 Cut Generation Algorithm for Model BSD-P
We now develop a cut-generation algorithm to solve BSD-P. This algorithm uses a







i) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , k,
z ∈ Z,
(2.20)
which are the relaxations of BSD-P over the subset of Ψmn (0) consisting of the generated
cuts. Note that, at the initial iteration k = 0, there are no cut constraints applied in problem
(2.20). If Z is convex and both f(z) and X(z) are concave in Z, problem (2.20) is a
convex stochastic program, which can be solved via well-studied Monte-Carlo sampling-
based methods such as sample average approximation (SAA), stochastic approximation
(SA), etc. (see (Birge & Louveaux, 2011; de Mello & Bayraksan, 2014; Kim et al., 2014;
Kushner & Clark, 1978; Kushner & Yin, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2014) and reference therein).
Under mild assumptions, the SAA method has been shown to have fast convergence rates
(Shapiro & de Mello, 2000; Shapiro et al., 2002). Also, solution quality is assessed by
bounding the optimality gap of a candidate solution in the multiple replication procedure
(Mak et al., 1999). Stochastic quasi-gradient (SQG) algorithms are the typical SA methods
to solve convex stochastic programming problems (Ermoliev, 1983). In particular, the
Mirror-Descent SQG methods introduced in (Lan, 2011; Nemirovski et al., 2009) exhibit
excellent performance on convergence rate and computational time.




k) by solving problem
(2.14). For the sake of readability, we rewrite problem (2.14) in the explicit quadratically
constrained linear programming (QCP) form as follows:
πmn (z) = min
c







⎞⎠ cj+i−k ≥ 0, (2.21b)
j = 0, . . . , n− i, i = 1, . . . ,m.
c0 = 0, cn = 1, (2.21c)











, j = 0, . . . , n, (2.21e)
where φ in the objective function (2.21a) is the vector-based function of Bernstein polyno-
mial bases given in (2.11), and constraints (2.21b)-(2.21e) repeat conditions (B1) - (B4) that
describe the feasible region Cmn (ε) of problem (2.14). See (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004;
Martein & Schaible, 1987; van de Panne, 1966) and reference therein for detail discussions
on properties and solution methods of QCP problems.




k) ≥ 0, z∗k is the optimal
solution of BSD-P. Otherwise, the constraint Πn(z, c
∗
k) ≥ 0 is added to the master problem
(2.20) as a valid cut. Algorithm 1 formally describes this cut-generation algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Cut-Generation Algorithm for Model BSD-P
Step 1 Choose γ > 0 and k = 0.
Step 2 Find the optimal solution z∗k of problem (2.20).
Step 3 Calculate πmn (z
∗
k) by solving problem (2.14). Let c
∗
k be the optimal
solution.
Step 4 If πn(z∗k) ≥ −γ, exit. Otherwise, let ck+1 = c∗k and k = k + 1. Then go
to step 2.
The following theorem 4 shows that Algorithm 1 terminates in finitely many iterations.
Let
ξmn (−γ) := max
z∈Ψmn (−γ)
f(z), (2.22)
which is a relaxation of BSD-P for γ > 0. ξmn (0) is the optimal value of BSD-P.
THEOREM 4. Algorithm 1 terminates in finitely many iterations. Let ξ̃mn be the optimal
value of problem (2.20) at the last iteration where Algorithm 1 terminates. Then ξmn (0) ≤
ξ̃mn ≤ ξmn (−γ).
2.5 Optimization Problem for the Most Robust Preference
The concept of RSD can also be used to seek a valid solution, at which the random out-





E (m)(X(z), Y ; uref ). (MDL-P)
Model MDL-P maximizes the maximum dominance level of the random outcome X(z) at




s.t. X(z) ε(m) Y w.r.t. uref ,
z ∈ Z, ε ∈ [0, 1].
(2.23)
For discussing the effect of the dominance level ε in MDL-P conveniently, we re-denote
πm(z) in (2.9) and πmn (z) in (2.14) as follows:
πm(z; ε) := min
u∈Um(ε)
Π(z, u), and (2.24)
πmn (z; ε) := min
c∈Cmn (ε)
Πn(z, c). (2.25)




s.t. πm(z; ε) ≥ 0,
z ∈ Z, ε ∈ [0, 1],
(2.26)




s.t. πmn (z; ε) ≥ 0,
z ∈ Z, ε ∈ [0, 1].
We now adapt Algorithm 1 to solve problem (2.27). The bisection method is used
to seek the largest ε in problem (2.27). For a given ε, if there exists z ∈ Z such that
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πmn (z; ε) ≥ 0, we increase ε; otherwise, we decrease ε. To verify the existence of such z
satisfying πmn (z; ε) ≥ 0 for a given ε, we develop a cut-generation approach analogous to





i) ≥ t, i = 1, . . . , k,
z ∈ Z,
(2.28)
where ci ∈ Cmn (ε) are generated coefficient cuts. Denote by (z∗k, t∗k), the optimal solution
of problem (2.28). Note that t∗k is also the optimal value of problem (2.28). If t
∗
k < 0, it
is verified that none of z ∈ Z can satisfy πmn (z; ε) ≥ 0. Otherwise, we calculate πmn (z∗k; ε)




k; ε) ≥ 0, z∗k is the




k) ≥ t is added
into the master problem (2.28) as a valid cut. Algorithm 2 formally describes this bisection
and cut-generation approach.
Algorithm 2 Bisection and Cut-Generation Algorithm for Model (2.27)
Step 1 Choose γ > 0, ε = 0, and ε = 1.
Step 2 If ε− ε ≤ γ, then exit. Otherwise, let ε = (ε− ε)/2, and k = 0.
Step 3 Find the optimal solution (z∗k, t
∗
k) of problem (2.28). If t
∗
k < −γ, then let
ε = ε, and goto step 2.
Step 4 Calculate πmn (z
∗
k; ε) by solving problem (2.25). Let c
∗
k be the optimal
solution. If πmn (z
∗
k; ε) ≥ −γ, then let ε = ε, and goto step 2.
Step 5 Let ck+1 = c∗k and k = k + 1. Go to step 3.
2.6 Case Study: Portfolio Investment
In this section we apply RSD-P to the portfolio optimization problem given in (Dentcheva
& Ruszczynski, 2003) involving N(= 8) assets: (S1) U.S. three-month treasury bills, (S2)
U.S. long-term government bonds, (S3) S&P 500, (S4) Willshire 5000, (S5) NASDAQ,
(S6) Lehmann Brothers corporate bond index, (S7) EAFE foreign stock index, and (S8)
gold. This problem uses M(= 22) yearly returns rij (i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . , N) of
these assets as equally probable realizations (See Table 2.2).
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, ∀u ∈ Um(ε), (2.29b)
N∑
j=1
zj = 1, (2.29c)
zj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N. (2.29d)
In the above problem, the objective (2.29a) seeks the best asset allocation to maximize the
expected total wealth, while the RSD constraint (2.29b) requires that this allocation should
be sufficiently preferred to the benchmark zY .
We discuss model (2.29) in four cases. In case (i), we consider the 2nd order RSD
constraint by setting m = 2 in (2.29b). The option of investing all money in S1 is used
as the benchmark, i.e., zY1 := {1, 0, . . . , 0}. S1 is a risk-free asset, using which the RSD
constraint (2.29b) guarantees the investment on risky assets to reach a given level of safety.





the reference, which is consistent with Examples 1 and 2 of Hannah’s purchasing lottery
tickets. Case (i) is default in this study, and we adapt it to the other three cases: case
(ii) substitutes the CARA reference utility function u2ref (x) :=
e−x−1
e−2−1 ; case (iii) uses an






, . . . , 1
N
}
, which equally invests on every asset; and
case (iv) discusses the 3rd order RSD constraint by letting m = 3. Table 2.3 summarizes
the different configurations. In this study, we let the measure μ in condition (A3) be the
uniform distribution on Θ.
Model (2.29) is approximated by the corresponding BSD-P. This study first tests the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 with γ = 10−10, and next analyzes the model
performance by adjusting dominance level ε. Finally, we discuss the application of model
(2.29) to Hannah’s investment.
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Table 2.2: Asset Returns (in %) in (Dentcheva & Ruszczynski, 2003)
Year S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
1 7.5 -5.8 -14.8 -18.5 -30.2 2.3 -14.9 67.7
2 8.4 2.0 -26.5 -28.4 -33.8 0.2 -23.2 72.2
3 6.1 5.6 37.1 38.5 31.8 12.3 35.4 -24.0
4 5.2 17.5 23.6 26.6 28.0 15.6 2.5 -4.0
5 5.5 0.2 -7.4 -2.6 9.3 3.0 18.1 20.0
6 7.7 -1.8 6.4 9.3 14.6 1.2 32.6 29.5
7 10.9 -2.2 18.4 25.6 30.7 2.3 4.8 21.2
8 12.7 -5.3 32.3 33.7 36.7 3.1 22.6 29.6
9 15.6 0.3 -5.1 -3.7 -1.0 7.3 -2.3 -31.2
10 11.7 46.5 21.5 18.7 21.3 31.1 -1.9 8.4
11 9.2 -1.5 22.4 23.5 21.7 8.0 23.7 -12.8
12 10.3 15.9 6.1 3.0 -9.7 15.0 7.4 -17.5
13 8.0 36.6 31.6 32.6 33.3 21.3 56.2 0.6
14 6.3 30.9 18.6 16.1 8.6 15.6 69.4 21.6
15 6.1 -7.5 5.2 2.3 -4.1 2.3 24.6 24.4
16 7.1 8.6 16.5 17.9 16.5 7.6 28.3 -13.9
17 8.7 21.2 31.6 29.2 20.4 14.2 10.5 -2.3
18 8.0 5.4 -3.2 -6.2 -17.0 8.3 -23.4 -7.8
19 5.7 19.3 30.4 34.2 59.4 16.1 12.1 -4.2
20 3.6 7.9 7.6 9.0 17.4 7.6 -12.2 -7.4
21 3.1 21.7 10.0 11.3 16.2 11.0 32.6 14.6
22 4.5 -11.1 1.2 -0.1 -3.2 -3.5 7.8 -1.0
Table 2.3: Configurations in the Four Studied Cases
Reference utility Benchmark RSD order
Case (i) u1ref z
Y1 2
Case (ii) u2ref z
Y1 2
Case (iii) u1ref z
Y2 2
Case (iv) u1ref z
Y1 3
2.6.1 Computational Analysis
All experiments are conducted on a laptop with Intel Core i7 processor with 4 physical
cores and hyper-threading on each core. The maximum frequency is 2.4 GHz with the boost
at specific core up to 3.2 GHz. The maximum amount of RAM allowed for computation is 2
GB for each core. Step 2 in Algorithm 1 is coded using the optimization toolbox of Matlab
R2015a, and step 3 is solved via the QCP solver of CPLEX 12.6. Both of the solvers work
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(d) Number of Generated Cuts.
Figure 2.1: Computational Results of Algorithm 1 for the Degree of BSD-P with u1ref and
zY1 .
in parallel modes, which create 4 clusters for Matlab and 4 threads for CPLEX. Algorithm
1 is tested for cases (i)-(iv) with ε = 0.1. We first discuss the performance of Algorithm 1
for case (i), and then compare the other cases.
Computational Results of Case (i). Figure A.1 reports the optimal values, optimal
solutions, running times, and numbers of generated cuts when the degree n of BSD-P
increases from 10 to 4500. Recall that the degree of BSD-P is the degree of Bernstein
polynomials approximating the set Um(ε). Shown in Figures 2.1a and A.1b, the optimal
value and solution fluctuate at the low degrees, but become stable for the degrees larger than
3500. Theorem 2 implies that the approximate RSD constraint, πmn (z) ≥ 0, in BSD-P can
be regarded as a relaxation of the true counterpart, πm(z) ≥ 0, in RSD-P. As n increases,
the effect of πmn (z) ≥ 0 is enhanced, and the approximate solution is stabilized for the
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Table 2.4: Computational Results of Cases (i)-(iv)
Case (i) Case (ii)
n 1500 2500 3500 4500 1500 2500 3500 4500
Opt Sol 0.339 0.544 0.711 0.711 0.506 0.696 0.720 0.722
0 0.001 0.009 0.009 0 0.008 0.001 0.005
0 0.001 0 0 0.002 0.003 0.001 0
0.064 0.110 0.197 0.198 0.117 0.192 0.200 0.195
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.374 0.209 0 0 0.220 0.011 0 0
0.131 0.055 0.009 0.007 0.070 0.013 0.005 0.006
0.091 0.080 0.075 0.075 0.084 0.076 0.072 0.070
Opt val 1.095 1.090 1.088 1.088 1.091 1.089 1.088 1.088
Running time 108.97 110.72 616.42 647.01 113.82 190.26 512.21 759.33
Num of cuts 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 3
Case (iii) Case (iv)
n 1500 2500 3500 4500 1500 2500 3500 4500
Opt Sol 0 0 0 0 0.304 0.344 0.353 0.354
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.225 0.240 0.251 0.279 0.061 0.067 0.074 0.078
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.349 0.355 0.373 0.362 0.388 0.383 0.389 0.397
0.290 0.271 0.245 0.221 0.151 0.117 0.098 0.085
0.136 0.133 0.130 0.138 0.096 0.089 0.086 0.084
Opt Val 1.112 1.112 1.111 1.110 1.096 1.094 1.094 1.093
Running time 121.84 367.44 569.98 616.48 86.47 293.96 584.74 687.84
Num of cuts 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3
convergence to the true solution. This is observed in Figure A.1b that the investment in the
optimal solution is highly diversified for a small n, while the risk-free asset S1, invested
solely in the benchmark zY1 , gets an overwhelming proportion of investment when n is
above 3500.
The running time of Algorithm 1 is related to not only the degree but also the number
of generated cuts. Note that the degree decides the number of decision variables in BSD-
P, and the number of generated cuts is the total iterations run by Algorithm 1. Figure
2.1c reflects the tendency that a longer running time is needed as the degree increases.
However, the number of generated cuts is independent of the degree shown in Figure 2.1d.
Particularly, Algorithm 1 generates 4 cuts when the degree varies in [3200, 3800], but there
are only 3 cuts for the degree in [3900, 4500]. As the results, the running time reaches the
peak, which is 710.11 seconds, for the degree is 3800, while it falls down to 494.94 seconds
for the degree is 3900. Then the running time grows again to 647.01 seconds as the degree
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increases to 4500.
Comparison between Computational Results of cases (i)-(iv). Table 2.4 lists the
optimal values, optimal solutions, running times, and numbers of generated cuts for cases
(i)-(iv) when the degree n increases from 1500 to 4500. The four cases have similar running
times and numbers of generated cuts. In average, Algorithm 2 runs 107.77, 240.73, 570.84,
and 677.67 seconds, and generates 4, 3.25, 3.75, and 3.25 cuts, when n equals 1500, 2500,
3500, and 4500, respectively.
Cases (i) and (ii) require n to be at least 3500 in order to get the stable optimal values
and optimal solutions, while cases (iii) and (iv) need n to be 1500. Cases (i)-(ii) use the
RSD constraints with zY1 . These constraints tell that the decision maker strongly desires a
low risk portfolio, in which S1 should be given an overwhelming proportion of investment.
In comparison, zY2 uniformly invests money to all the assets, and this diversification makes
the RSD constraint in case (iii) weaker than in cases (i)-(ii). Similarly, by Proposition 3,
the 3rd order RSD constraint in case (iv) is also a relaxation of the 2nd order one in case
(i). The test results in Table 2.4 show that it needs a large n to approximate the RSD
constraints with zY1 . Indeed, for a small n, the approximate RSD constraint produces a
highly diversified portfolio, which is unable to research the strong requirement on low risk.
With the weaker RSD constraints, cases (iii) and (iv) do not need n to be very large.
2.6.2 Effect Analysis of the RSD Constraint
We now analyze cases (i)-(iv) to test the effect of the RSD constraint (2.29b). The re-
sults are given in Figures 3.3 and 2.3. In this test, the degree of approximation is 4500, and
the dominance level ε is adjusted in [0, 0.14]. In each case we divide this interval into three
sub-intervals — weak region, mild region, and strong region — due to the strength of the
RSD constraint (2.29b). In general, ε in the weak region is very small such that the optimal
value and solutions of model (2.29) are identical to ones given by only using the reference
utility function (i.e., ε = 0). Indeed, the RSD constraint (2.29b) has a limited impact on
the performance of model (2.29) in the weak region. The strong region is opposite, for
ε is rather large. The corresponding optimal value and solutions are very stable, and are
indifferent to the reference utility function. In contrast, model (2.29) is sensitive to ε in the
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mild region. A small change on ε may incur completely different asset allocations in the
portfolio.



































































































Figure 2.2: Impact of RSD on Optimal Asset Allocations for Cases (i)-(iv).
Case (i). In this case, the RSD constraint (2.29b) compares risky asset allocations with
the benchmark zY1 , which only invests the risk-free asset S1. Shown in Figures 2.2a and
2.3, the weak region is [0, 0.01], the mild region is (0.01, 0.08), and the strong region is
[0.08, 0.14]. Model (2.29) with ε in the weak region suggests that S7 obtain 100% of the
total investment and yields the highest expected total wealth 1.141. As we increase ε to the
mild region, the investment is diversified. For example, at ε = 0.04, the percentage of S7 in
the portfolio dramatically decreases from 100% to 39.1%, while the percentages of S2, S4,
S6, and S8 rise to 13.6%, 2.4%, 26.2%, and 18.6%, respectively. At ε = 0.06, S1 becomes
crucial in the portfolio, owning 70.3% of the total investment and overwhelming S7 of
which the percentage reduces to 1.2%. These results reflect the fact that, for satisfying
the sufficient preference over the benchmark, the RSD constraint (2.29b) requires a large
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Figure 2.3: Expected Total Wealths of Cases (i)-(iv).
percentage of the total investment on the risk-free asset S1 to reduce the investment risk.
As the effect of the RSD constraint (2.29b) is enhanced by increasing ε, S1 gets more
percentage until the strong region is reached. In the strong region, the investment is stable
at (72.7%, 0.5%, 0.1%, 19.2%, 0%, 0%, 0.7%, 6.8%), which is very close to the solution
(72.7%, 0.4%, 0%, 19.3%, 0%, 0%, 0.7%, 6.8%) suggested by the classical second order
stochastic dominance (ε = 1). In addition, the decrease in the investment risk greatly
reduces the expected total wealth, which rapidly decreases from 1.141 to 1.089 as ε changes
from 0 to 0.05, and then slowly changes to 1.088. The over-conservativeness of stochastic
dominance results in a very low yield, in comparison with the risk-free investment on S1
yielding the expected total wealth 1.078.
Case (ii). This case is designed to test the effect of the reference utility function in the
RSD constraint (2.29b). We substitute the CARA utility function u2ref for the CRRA utility
function u1ref . In contrast, for the total wealth more than 1, u
2
ref has a higher Arrow and














, for x > 1. (2.30)
Hence, in this study, u2ref characterizes stronger preference for low-risk investment than
u1ref . It can be seen in Figures 2.2b and 2.3 that this substitution shrinks the weak region
to [0, 0.003]. A subtle change on ε = 0 has a big impact on the investment proportion and
total wealth. Analogous to case (i), the investment is diversified to hedge the risk in the
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mild region (0.003, 0.08). However, case (ii) has a much faster diversification rate. The
asset allocation at ε = 0.04 is (68.3%, 1.2%, 0%, 19.3%, 0%, 2.2%, 1.2%, 7.9%), in which
S1 has become a major invested asset, compared to 0% of the total investment on S1 in
case (i). Also, this allocation is close to the stable solution, (72.7%, 0.5%, 0.1%, 19.2%,
0%, 0%, 0.7%, 6.8%), obtained in the strong region [0.08, 0.14]. Cases (i) and (ii) have the
same asset allocation and total wealth in the strong region. This observation verifies that,
for a sufficiently large ε, the RSD constraint (2.29b) is indifferent to the reference utility
function, and approaches to the classical stochastic dominance.
Case (iii). In this case the equal allocation benchmark zY2 is substituted for the risk-free
investment zY1 . Model (2.29) suggests a completely different investment policy without
over-emphasizing the safety of investment. Shown in Figure 2.2c, S1 is not invested on,
but S7 always obtains more than 22.8%. Figure 2.3 also indicates that the risky investment
greatly raises the expected total wealth. In this case, the weak region is [0, 0.01] and the
mild region is (0.01, 0.14]. Since the RSD constraint (2.29b) is ineffective in the weak
region, the best policy is still 100% of the total investment on S7. As ε increases, the
investment on S7 monotonically decreases, while S2, S4, S6, and S8 obtain more. The asset
allocation is (0%, 6.3%, 0%, 9.7%, 0%, 18%, 47.2%, 18.7%) at ε = 0.04, and changes to
(0%, 0%, 0%, 26.4%, 0%, 37.7%, 22.8%, 13%) at ε = 0.14. Different from case (i), there
is not an overwhelming asset in case (iii), restricted by the benchmark zY2 where every
asset is equally treated.
Case (iv). This case tests the 3rd order RSD. As indicated by Proposition 1, case (iv)
with the 3rd order RSD constraint (2.29b) is the relaxation of case (i). As the result, shown
in Figures 2.2d and 2.3, the weak region is enlarged to [0, 0.02], the strong region shrinks to
[0.13, 0.14], and the diversification rate is much slower in the widely spanned mild region.
Moreover, the curve of the total wealth in case (iv) is always above the curve in case (i).
At ε = 0.04, the asset allocation is (0%, 26.2%, 0%, 4.1%, 0%, 0.6%, 47.7%, 21.3%),
in which case (iv) suggest 8.6% (= 47.7% - 39.1%) of the total investment on S7 more
than case (i). At ε = 0.06, the allocation is (18.8%, 3.2%, 0%, 2.3%, 0%, 37.5%, 25.8%,
12.5%), in which S7 still gets more investment than S1 and S6 has the largest percentage.
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2.6.3 Hannah’s Decision
We now discuss an investor’s desired dominance level in this portfolio problem. Recall
that Example 2 estimates Hannah’s desired dominance level. To simply the discussion,
we assume that Hannah suggests the same probability region for ϑ1 = $0.5, ϑ2 = $1,
and ϑ3 = $1.5. The example discusses the comparison between the lottery tickets X̄i,
i = 1, . . . , 9, and non-purchase option ϑ2 in Table 2.1. We ask Hannah to select the lottery
tickets which she is not reluctant to purchase or must not purchase, and then evaluate her
desired dominance level for risky investment. In Example 2, Hannah selects X̄1, X̄2, X̄3,
X̄8, and X̄9, and her desired dominance level is estimated to be
[
E2(X̄3, ϑ2; ūref ) + E2(ϑ2, X̄8; ūref )
]
/2 = 0.040. (2.31)
Since ūref in Example 2 is u
1
ref used in this portfolio problem, we are able to use Hannah’s
desired dominance level to decide her best investment policy in case (i). Figure 2.2a shows
that 0.040 is in the mild region of case (i). Her preferred asset allocation is (0%, 13.6%,
0%, 2.4%, 0%. 26.2%, 39.1%, 18.6%) and the expected total wealth is 1.111.
Suppose that Hannah is a veteran investor, and is able to accurately characterize her
own risk attitude. Then under ūref , she will select all X̄i (i = 1, . . . , 9) in Table 2.1. Her
desired dominance level is
[
E2(X̄5, ϑ2; ūref ) + E2(ϑ2, X̄6; ūref )
]
/2 = 0.004, (2.32)
which is in the weak region. It means that Hannah puts all investment on S7, and the ex-
pected total wealth rises to 1.141. Oppositely, Hannah has hesitating attitude. There may
be an investment expert to design a utility assessment questionnaire to help characterize
her risk preference. Notwithstanding Hannah’s reference utility function is estimated to be
ūref , she is not sure on her answers to the assessment questions. Actually, she shows inter-
est in only purchasing X̄1 and X̄2, and insists in not purchasing X̄9. Such hesitating attitude
could incur high ambiguity in the assessment procedure. Hence, her desire dominant level
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is suggested to be
[
E2(X̄2, ϑ2; ūref ) + E2(ϑ2, X̄9; ūref )
]
/2 = 0.063. (2.33)
This level is in the strong region. Her preferred asset allocation is (66.7%, 1.1%, 0%,
18.4%, 0%, 4.2%, 1.6%, 8%) and the expected total wealth decreases to 1.089. Recall that
the expected total wealth is 1.078 for the risk-free investment.
2.7 Conclusions
This study has introduced a novel concept of reference-based almost stochastic domi-
nance (RSD) and its application in risk averse optimization problems. In the L2-normed
space, we have specified a subset of the general class of risk averse utility functions.
This subset consists of nonparametric shape-preserving perturbations around a given refer-
ence utility function. The RSD represents a preference relation that a preferred uncertain
prospect should have the larger expected utility over the perturbation subset. We have also
defined the maximum dominance level, which quantifies the decision maker’s preference
between alternative choices in the context of robustness.
We have proposed the RSD constrained stochastic optimization model and studied its
solution method. An approximation approach based on Bernstein polynomials has been
developed. This approach resorts to a cut-generation algorithm. We have discussed the
convergence rate of the approximate feasible region, shown the asymptotic convergence of
the optimal value and the set of optimal solutions obtained in this approach, and proved that
the algorithm has finitely many iterations. In addition, we have adapted the cut-generation
algorithm to seek a valid option most robustly preferred to a random benchmark.
The portfolio optimization problem given in (Dentcheva & Ruszczynski, 2003) has
been used to analyze the computational complexity of the approximation approach and
to illustrate the effect of the RSD constraint. We have compared four cases with differ-
ent benchmarks, reference utility functions, and dominance orders. In addition, we have
discussed the impact of an investor’s desired dominance level on asset allocations.
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Chapter 3
Balance of Preference Maximization and Preference Ambiguity Sensitivity Analysis
in Risk-Averse Decision Making
3.1 Introduction
Risk-averse stochastic optimization is a technique commonly used by the decision mak-
ers in risk management problems with uncertain outcomes. “Risk” is the possibility of
change in the value of decision due to changes in the value of the underlying components
on which that decision was made (McNeil et al., 2015). Obviously, risk is associated with
uncertainties associated with outcomes. However, uncertain outcomes are not the only
sources of the risk. The value of the decision can change also from the point of view of
decision maker himself, due to preference ambiguity. To manage this risk sources, in this
chapter we require the optimal decision to be robust with regards to both sources of risk-
uncertainties in outcomes and decision maker’s preference ambiguity. We achieve robust-
ness of the solutions by incorporating sensitivity analysis with regards to decision maker’s
preference characteristics, in a classical expected utility maximization model.
Expected utility maximization is one of well implemented frameworks of risk-averse
stochastic optimization. Applications of such utility maximization models can be found
in almost any area of industry, including finance (Benidis et al., 2018; Bruni et al., 2014;
Cornuejols & Tutuncu, 2006; Hu et al., 2011; Roman et al., 2013), transportation (Li et al.,
2014; Nie et al., 2011), response systems (Noyan, 2010), energy management (Gollmer et
al., 2008), etc... In this framework a rational decision maker’s risk preference is represented
by a unique utility function (see Friedman & Savage, 1948; von Neumann & Morgenstern,
2007, and others in references). Thus, the risks associated to decision maker’s prefer-
ence characteristics are entangled with his utility function. Classically, before solving the
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expected utility maximization model, the decision maker is tested to satisfy 3:A-3:C funda-
mental axioms of utility theory (see von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). If these axioms
are satisfied, then the decision maker’s preference can be mapped to a unique utility func-
tion. Then that utility function is assessed using some kind of parametric or non-parametric
approach.
However, in expected utility maximization, due to preference ambiguity, may produce
a solution which may produce a solution which may not be preferred by decision maker.
We refer to such solutions as “sensitive with regards to preference ambiguity” (correspond-
ingly, we will refer to solutions insensitive to preference ambiguity as “stable with regards
to preference ambiguity”). Besides the aforementioned studies aimed at detecting the so-
lutions sensitivity to preference of the decision maker, we present in section 3.1.3 of liter-
ature review several real world studies hindered by the problems arising from the (Chl 2)
and (Chl 1) sources of risks.
The solution’s sensitivity to preference is not a new problem in decision analysis (see
Sage, 1981; Samson, 1988, comprehensive overview). But the sensitivity analysis is usu-
ally performed as a post-optimality step. In this chapter we go further, and suggest to
incorporate the sensitivity analysis with respect to the decision maker’s preference in the
optimization framework, instead of cyclic application of sensitivity analysis of the solu-
tion in post-optimality stage. Suggested ideology is similar to the incorporation of the risk
measure in the optimization framework suggested by Markowitz (1952). In our model we
couple risk-aversion and the sensitivity analysis in bi-objective optimization model for a
utility maximizer decision maker.
3.1.1 Balance of Preference Maximization and Sensitivity-Averseness
It is important to note, that despite the inconsistencies in preferences, the majority of
decision maker’s have “core” behavioral traits which they strive to follow, such as prefer-
ence maximization and/or risk-averseness. In other words, a preference maximizing (and/or
risk-averse) decision maker for any given choice will try to pick an option which has highest
utility (and/or lowest outcome risk) from their point of view (Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017;
Echenique et al., 2011; Loomes, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The emphasis being
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on “their point of view”, which might not be consistent.
Thus, in general, preferring options which maximize the decision maker’s preference is
still logically correct and shall not be abandoned. The assessed utility function might not
fully represent the decision maker, but it may capture the core properties of his behavior.
To emphasize this, we refer to the assessed utility function as a decision maker’s “reference
utility function”, which we denote as u#.
We accomplish the modeling of a preference maximizing decision maker using a clas-
sical method of having a preference relation as an objective function in stochastic opti-
mization models. For a given decision maker the model tries to find an option X which
will be maximally preferred by him to some bottom line option Y called “benchmark”.
Examples of benchmarks are non-purchase (or certain outcome) options in optimal lottery
purchase problems in decision analysis (Hu & Stepanyan, 2017; Leshno & Levy, 2002),
given market index in enhanced indexation problems in finance (Benidis et al., 2018; Bruni
et al., 2014; Cornuejols & Tutuncu, 2006), 100% investment in non-risky asset or equal
investment in all assets in portfolio optimization problems (Armbruster & Delage, 2015;
Dentcheva & Ruszczynski, 2003; Hu & Stepanyan, 2017), or the outcomes of placebo drug
in health care problems (Giancristofaro & Bonnini, 2008).
According to Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory the preference of X
to Y , denoted as X u# Y , is defined as E[u#(X)] ≥ E[u#(Y )]. We also denote the strict
preference of these two options, E[u#(X)] > E[u#(Y )], as X u# Y and the equivalence,
E[u#(X)] = E[u#(Y )], as X u# Y . With this notation, the objective function of an
preference maximizer decision maker will have following form
max
X
X u# Y. (3.1)
At the same time, we argue that it is also logical for a decision maker to avoid solutions
which are sensitive with regards to ambiguity his preference. We call this kind of behavior
a “sensitive-averse”. To model a sensitive-averse decision maker we use a sensitivity mea-
sure of preference relation regarding decision maker’s reference utility function (referred
as SMU and denoted by M). The measure, that we use was first introduced in (Insua et
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al., 1997). It measures the maximal perturbation on the decision maker’s reference utility
function while keeping the preference of X to Y intact. We restrict it to preserve “core” be-
havioral patterns in perturbations and maximize its value in stochastic optimization model
as a second objective function.
max
X
M[X u# Y ]. (3.2)
A decision maker’s personal preferences may typically have lower maximal sensitivity
levels and these two objective functions are in conflict with each other. Thus, instead of
a single optimal value, we often get a whole set of Pareto-optimal frontier. The decision
maker’s final goal is to pick a solution which will balance his preference of X to Y and its
sensitivity.
3.1.2 The Sensitivity Measure
In the utilitarian theory there are two major ways of modeling decision maker’s choice
inconsistencies: random utility theory (RUT) and random preference theory (RPT). RUT
assumes that the decision maker makes his decisions according to his ”true” utility function.
But, the utility of any preference fluctuates by adding some random value. The RUT allows
to model decision maker’s core behavioral traits in the utility function. Additionally by
controlling the variance of the random error term results in high level of accuracy (see Hess
et al., 2018; Hey & Orme, 1994; McFadden, 1974). On the other hand, RPT assumes that
when making decision decision maker can be described by some function from a functional
set. Compared to RUT, it has an advantage of not imposing any probability distribution on
error term, but it has a disadvantage of requiring computationally harder algorithms to solve
(see Loomes, 2005, for a comprehensive comparison).
In our optimization models decision maker’s choice inconsistencies are measured with
a special sensitivity measure (SMU). This measure was first introduced by Insua et al.
(1997) in the Bayesian statistical decision theory under the name of ”εu#-robust sensitivity
measure”. It models inconsistent decision maker similar to RUT and RPT. It borrows from
RUT the ideas of having a core behavioral traits encoded in reference utility function and
having a fluctuation on it. But unlike RUT, the reference utility function fluctuations are
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constructed as a convex sum of it and a function from functional set V, similar to RPT.
The functional set V encodes core behavioral traits as decision maker’s reference utility
function. But since those behavioral traits are very basic fundamentals (such as risk attitude
or preference maximization), it contains all the functions satisfying them. To illustrate the
idea of the construction of functional set V, we present bellow simple example similar to
example 1 from Insua et al. (1997).
EXAMPLE 3. A simple functional set V based on assessed finite utility points.
Suppose that decision maker’s reference utility function is assessed using some classical
non-parametric standard utility assessment questionnaire, which produced following initial
utility assessments:
u#(0) = 0, u#(0.38) = 0.5, u#(0.58) = 0.7,
u#(0.7) = 0.8, u#(0.84) = 0.9, u#(1) = 1. (3.3)
From these values we can conclude, that the decision maker is a preference maximizer
(u# is increasing) with a risk-averse attitude (u# is concave). Thus the set V can be con-
structed as follows
V = {v : v is increasing concave, v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1} (3.4)

The SMU uses functions from V set to perturb decision maker’s reference utility func-
tion u#. And similar to classical sensitivity measures, the SMU measures the maximal
amount of that perturbation on the reference utility function the given preference relation-
ship of option X to Y can withstand.
3.1.3 Literature Review
Suggested in this chapter bi-objective model incorporating risk-aversion and sensitivity-
aversion in one optimization framework to our knowledge is a novel approach of solving
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problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2). However, the problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) themselves are
not new in stochastic optimization.
Suggested by Dentcheva & Ruszczynski (2003) optimization models with stochastic
dominance constraints can be viewed as a simplistic way of solving these problems. In
these models the optimal outcome is required to be preferred to benchmark for all possible
decision makers with specific core behavioral trait. For the first order stochastic dominance
the core trait is the preference maximization, for the second it is risk-averseness towards
the outcomes. It is obvious that optimal solutions of such models are extremely stable
with regards to preference ambiguity, as the problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) are eliminated
by considering all possible utility functions describing corresponding core behavioral trait.
The shortcoming of this approach is its over conservativeness and lack of individual-
ism. By requiring for the solution to be preferable for all possible preference maximizer (for
second order also risk-averse) decision makers, these models completely lose any individ-
ualism encoded in decision maker’s reference utility function (see Armbruster & Delage,
2015; Hu & Mehrotra, 2014; Hu & Stepanyan, 2017). Additionally, this models are well
known of considering utility functions describing rather inhumane behaviors (see Hu et al.,
2014; Leshno & Levy, 2002; Lizyayev & Ruszczyński, 2012). The aforementioned and
other studies from the stochastic optimization with almost stochastic dominance field try
to resolve over conservativeness and/or lack of decision maker’s individualism, by limit-
ing considered utility functions in the stochastic dominance constraints. However, it also
means that problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) can arise again and make the solutions sensitive
to decision maker’s preference ambiguity.
Another approach of solving problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) in stochastic optimization is
the sensitivity analysis of optimal solution with regards to decision maker’s reference utility
function. The sensitivity analysis is usually performed in post-optimality stage, where the
optimal solution is tested to be stable with regards to preference ambiguity by perturbing
different parameters of the stochastic optimization models and solving them again in a
cyclic iterative decision process (French & Insua, 1989; Insua & French, 1991; Sage, 1981;
Samson, 1988, ,etc...).
In the majority of the literature, for multiattribute decision models sensitivity analysis
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with regards to the decision maker’s utility function is performed on aggregation weights
only. This is due to computational efficiency of the solution methods, compared to sensitiv-
ity analysis performed with regards to general function forms. Alexander (1989) presents
five measures of sensitivity designed for solution ranking of complex decision making mod-
els. The study tries to quantify the sensitivity of the solutions of the multi-criteria, multiat-
tribute decision models with respect to the weights in additive objective function. Four of
suggested measures are designed to use the ranking numbers, while one- the “Alexander’s
S”, uses the utility of random outcome in the ranking. Similar to Samson (1988) authors
suggest to use iterative process for complex decision models, with several runs of the model
and sensitivity analysis of the solution. Barron & Schmidt (1988) provide two models for
the computation of weights, which change the current solution to another while satisfying
specific distance based criteria. First method is based on maximum entropy principle and
produces results which tend to be equally distributed, while the second is based on least
squares distance, which produces results as close as possible to the original weights. The
study provides closed form formulas for first and in special cases for the second model.
Triantaphyllou & Sánchez (1997) uses sensitivity analysis to find the most important at-
tributes and criteria in deterministic multi-criteria decision models. The study defines the
sensitivity of the criteria as the reciprocal of the smallest percent by which its weight must
change to induce change in the existing ranking. Similarly the sensitivity of the alternative
in terms of a criterion in a given ranking is defined the reciprocal of the smallest percent by
which its value in that criterion must change to induce change in its rank in the ranking.
Obviously, the shortcoming of such approaches are the lack of sensitivity analysis on
the functional forms of final utility function.
Sensitivity analysis done with regards to general form of utility functions is much more
scarce in the literature. Even though the necessity of consideration of which is mentioned
in almost all guideline studies (Insua & French, 1991; Sage, 1981; Samson, 1988, , etc...).
In (French & Insua, 1989; Insua & French, 1991) suggested analyzing the sensitivity
of the ranking with respect to some parameter in objective function in generalized frame-
work of sensitivity analysis in discrete multi-objective decision making. Similar to Samson
(1988) in these studies the decision analysis is a repetitive cycle of stages of judgmental
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elicitation, computation and sensitivity analysis. In the sensitivity analysis phase, it is as-
sumed that the decision maker cannot provide further information in the elicitation phase,
without further insight and reflection. Sensitivity analyses is viewed as a means of stimu-
lating him to think more closely about the problem. The analysis tries to find other possibly
optimal alternatives by varying a parameter in objective function. Unlike the other studies
this parameter is not bound to be an aggregation weight. The study tries to quantify the
sensitivity of the chosen alternative on the basis of this variation. If the small variation in a
parameter induces change then the solution is considered sensitive. The minimal amount of
variation then is taken as absolute measure of sensitivity of the alternative with respect to
that parameter. The absolute sensitivity value of the chosen alternative can be normalized
by dividing it by the sensitivity of the most stable alternative.
Based on this foundation Insua et al. (1997) presented the generalized sensitivity mea-
sure for a solution in decision analysis with respect to preference of decision maker us-
ing a utility set. They measure maximum perturbation of the given preference relation in
some functional set. The parameter controls the linear contamination of decision maker’s
assessed utility function. This method is well known as ε-contamination in Bayesian sensi-
tivity analysis (see Berger et al., 2000). The idea is to construct a perturbation neighborhood
around that parameter value and solve the problem based on common ground. If the con-
clusions agree then the parameter is robust (see Berger et al., 1994). However, in Bayesian
sensitivity and decision analysis the most work has concentrated on investigations about
sensitivity with respect to the prior. And even though, the necessity of sensitivity analysis
with respect to both the prior and the utility function is notes in several studies such as (In-
sua et al., 1997; Smith, 1994), to our knowledge Insua et al. (1997) is the only paper which
addresses this problems. This is probably, due to the disconnect between the Bayesian
Statistics and statistical decision theory mentioned in Liese & Miescke (2007), or due to
inherit computational difficulty of the algorithms of non-parametric stochastic optimization
with functional sets.
In their study, Insua et al. (1997) note that computations of robust neighborhoods are
difficult in the general case of imprecision in both the utility and the prior. They present
only upper and lower bounds for the computation of sensitivity measure. In this study we
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incorporate it in two bi-objective optimization problems, then by using some linearization
methods we were able to reformulate them as a mixed-integer and linear programming
models.
Examples of the preference inconsistencies in the field.
The problems (Chl 1) and (Chl 2) have been constantly registered throughout the years
in various real studies in decision making. Below we present some of our finding.
In 2016 Dean & Martin (2016) analyzed the data of grocery purchases recorded by
Aguiar & Hurst (2007) for the 1993-1995 years in the Denver metropolitan area retail
outlets. It was found, 71% of 977 representative households have inconsistent results in the
their decisions of purchases. Similarly, in 2011 Echenique et al. (2011) analyzed widely
used Stanford Basket Dataset containing grocery purchases from four stores in an urban
area of a large U.S. mid-western city for the 1991-1993 years. It was found that 80% of
unique 494 households purchase decisions cannot be described with classical single utility
functions because of inconsistencies.
In the book of Decision Making in Health Care Chapman & Elstein (2013) presented an
overview of several examples of preference inconsistencies. Particularly in 1997 Stalmeier
et al. (1997) conducted three experiments to test the preferences of in total of 176 students
of the University of Nijmegen in Netherlands. In the first experiment 33 university stu-
dents and 17 high school students were selected by the condition that they preferred living
25 years to living 50 years with metastasized breast cancer. After being selected, women
were asked how many years in good health they consider equivalent to the outcomes. In
contrary the classical expected utility theory, 23 of the 33 university students and 14 of
the 17 high school students assigned higher value to 50 years. Since the students were
informed about the potency of the metastasized breast cancer, it was assumed that living
25 or 50 years with metastasis may not be realistic. Which could have impacted students
decisions. Thus in the second experiment the breast cancer was replaced with much realis-
tic health state of having chronic migraines on average of 4.5 days per week. 16 students
were selected by the condition that they have preferred living 10 years to living 20 years
with such condition. And again students were asked how many years in good health they
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consider equivalent to the outcomes. Out of 16 students 15 assigned a larger values to the
option of 20 years, therefore again presenting inconsistent preferences. To test the nature
of inconsistent preferences in the third experiment 27 students were confronted with the
preference reversals and asked whether they wanted to change their response patterns. All
27 students indicated that they understand that their answers were inconsistent and only 4
of 27 participants undid their original preference reversals. Finally, to test the possibility of
inconsistent preferences arising because of inexperience of the students with health states
in the questionnaires in 2001 Stalmeier et al. (2001) published results of interviews from
June 1996 until May 1997 conducted with the patients from the Neurology Department
outpatient clinic at the University of Illinois Hospital in Chicago. All patients had a history
of migraines and were thus highly familiar with the health state of living with migraines. 10
out of 14 patients were selected by the condition that they have preferred living 10 years to
living 20 years with chronic migraines for 5.9 days per week. Of the 10 patients with such
preferences, seven patients exhibited a preference reversal and after confrontation about it
only 2 changed their answers. As a result (Stalmeier et al., 2001, 1997) conclude that pref-
erence reversals within a single dimension suggests irrationalities at a more fundamental
level.
3.1.4 Organization
This chapter is structured the following way. Section 3.2 pretenses the sensitivity mea-
sure, it’s properties in economic theory, the Frechet derivative and the idea of sensitivity
aversion. Section 3.3 presents the multi-objective multi-attribute optimization model and
it’s properties for additively independent attributes. Section 3.4 presents the tractable re-
formulations of the general model for increasing and increasing, concave utility functions.
Section 3.5 presents the application of constructed model for Homeland Security budget
allocation study.
3.2 Sensitivity Measure of Utility (SMU)
Consider two N -dimensional random vectors X̄, Ȳ ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) with the support
Θ ⊆ RN . We write X̄ = (X1, . . . , XN) and Ȳ = (Y1, . . . , YN) where Xi and Yi are
the ith components of X̄ and Ȳ . As presented in section 3.1.2, in this study we use the
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sensitivity measure described in (Insua et al., 1997). They propose the εu-robust measure
allowing perturbations in both the utility function and the prior distribution. The pertur-
bations are linearly added on the current assessment within classes modeling imperfect
judgment. In this paper we restrict our discussion to such utility function, while assuming
that the probability distribution of X̄ and Ȳ is known. In the following definition of the
εu-robust measure the reference utility function u
# is linearly perturbed within the set V
representing ambiguity in utility assessment.
DEFINITION 3. The sensitivity measure of the preference relation X̄ u# Ȳ regarding
the reference utility function u# is
M[X̄ u# Ȳ ] := max{ε | X̄ u Ȳ , u ∈ U(u#, ε), ε ∈ [0, 1]}, (SMU)
where
U(u#, ε) := {u | u = (1− ε)u# + εv, v ∈ V}. (3.5)
The sensitivity measure quantifies the maximum amount of perturbation of u# that the
preference relation can withstand.
REMARK 2. If Ȳ is preferred to X̄ by the decision maker’s reference utility function
u#, the set {ε | X̄ u Ȳ , u ∈ U(u#, ε), ε ∈ [0, 1]} is empty. By Definition 3, M[X̄ u# Ȳ ]
is the objective value of the infeasible maximization problem equal to −∞.
Remark 2 completes the definition of SMU mathematically; however, it is meaningless
for the decision maker to be concerned about the level of sensitivity of an unfavorable
relationship. In the late statement we limit our discussion to the case of X̄ u# Ȳ while
addressing the properties of SMU.
3.2.1 Properties of SMU
We now investigate the properties of SMU. It straightforwardly follows by definition 3
that an equivalent representation of SMU is
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M[X̄ u# Ȳ ] =max ε (3.6)
subject to (1− ε)E[u#(X̄)− u#(Ȳ )] + εmin
v∈V
E[v(X̄)− v(Ȳ )] ≥ 0,
ε ∈ [0, 1].
Insua et al. (1997) give an alternative formulation of (3.6) in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4 (Insua et al. (1997)).




E[u#(X̄)− u#(Ȳ )]−minv∈V E[v(X̄)− v(Ȳ )]
}
. (3.7)
We observe that, if X̄ u# Ȳ and there exists v ∈ V such that Ȳ v X̄ ,
M[X̄ u# Ȳ ] =
E[u#(X̄)− u#(Ȳ )]
E[u#(X̄)− u#(Ȳ )]−minv∈V E[v(X̄)− v(Ȳ )]
=
1
1 + maxv∈V E[v(Ȳ )]−E[v(X̄)]
E[u#(X̄)]−E[u#(Ȳ )]
. (3.8)
By the second equality in (3.8), SMU can be explained as the normalized ratio of the
maximal level of perturbation given by maxv∈V E[v(Ȳ )] − E[v(X̄)] and the level of the
preference of X̄ to Ȳ with respect to u#. We also derive the following conditions for SMU
to catch two boundary values.
(i) M[X̄ u# Ȳ ] = 1 if and only if X̄ v Ȳ for all v ∈ V.
(ii) M[X̄ u# Ȳ ] = 0 if and only if X̄ u# Ȳ and there exists v ∈ V such that Ȳ v X̄ .
In case (i), X̄ is preferred Ȳ over the entire set V, which is the necessary weak preference
relation called by Greco et al. (2007). Moreover, this is the first (second) order stochastic
dominance if V consists of all increasing (concave) utility functions (Bawa, 1975; Hadar
& Russell, 1969; Hanoch & Levy, 1975; Müller & Stoyan, 2002; Shaked & Shanthikumar,
1994). Oppositely, case (ii) tells that the ranking of X̄ and Ȳ is very sensitive with regards
to preference ambiguity, if they are indifferent regarding u# but not over the entire set V.
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3.2.2 Effect of the Reference Utility Function on SMU
The inconsistency in utility assessment and the decision maker’s mutable attitude bring
on the ambiguity in characterizing his risk preference. In this section we quantifies the
impact of the reference utility function u# on SMU. To write more concisely, we define
two functionals on L2 for given random vectors X̄ and Ȳ as
〈F , u〉 := E[u(X̄)− u(Ȳ )], 〈M, u〉 := M[X̄ u Ȳ ], for u ∈ L2, (3.9)
and a function as
N(x) :=
x
x−minv∈V E[v(X̄)− v(Ȳ )]
. (3.10)
The theorem below presents the Frechet derivative of SMU with respect to u#. This deriva-
tive gouges the rate of the change on SMU resulting from a linear perturbation on u#.












the Frechet derivatives of functionals
M and F with respect to u# acting on the direction h ∈ L2, respectively. If (i) X̄ u# Ȳ
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= E[h(X̄)− h(Ȳ )]. (3.13)









By the definition of the Frechet differentiability (Cheney (2001); Clarke (2013)), the func-
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the Frechet derivative of F with respect to u# acting on the direction h. It is easy to verify












(3.12). Since the derivatives in equations (3.12) and (3.13) exist, equation (3.11) follows
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measures the sensitivity of this preference












, are the rates of the changes




in the chain rule
(3.11) links the two changes.
























≥ 0 implies that the decision maker becomes more confident








3.3 Multi-Objective Optimization Model Using SMU
Expected utility maximization is a broadly-implemented risk-averse stochastic pro-
gramming technique (Fishburn, 1979; Vickson & Ziemba, 2014; von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 2007; Yan, 2018), which suggests an optimal solution due to the decision maker’s
risk preference. We propose a bi-objective optimization model to maximize not only the
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expected utility but also the sensitivity measure of the utility (ESM) as
max E[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ )]
max M[X̄(z) u# Ȳ ]
subject to z ∈ Z,
(ESM)
where Z ⊆ RG is a decision region, X̄ : Z 
→ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) represents a random outcome
due to the decision, and Ȳ ∈ (Ω,F , P ; Θ) is a given benchmark. In model ESM the first
objective is to maximize expected utility approaching the risk arising in systemic stochas-
ticity, while the second is to maximize the SMU for reducing the impact of the ambiguity
of the reference utility.
When observed with equation (3.6), it can be seen that the SMU in the second objec-
tive function maximally perturbs the excess expected utility value from the first objective
function in ESM model. The perturbation is achieved with a utility function from the set V
producing the worst preference of X̄(z) to Ȳ . This observation allows us to draw various
use cases of model ESM, based on the construction of perturbation set V.
In this work we focus on cases, where the perturbation set V is constructed to contain
all the utility functions satisfying the core risk-attitude characteristics of a decision maker.
Then the model ESM will produce Pareto-optimal solutions each of which results to a
random performance maximally preferred to Ȳ under the reference utility function u#,
while having the best stability with regards to preference ambiguity. An example of such
perturbation set for a risk-averse decision maker can be the following
V := {v : v is increasing concave}. (3.16)
In that case ESM model can also be viewed as a balancing framework between risk-aversion
and sensitivity-aversion. We discuss this property of ESM model in detail in the section
3.3.1.
Other than the problems with preference ambiguity, ESM model can be used in social
decision making problems. As an example the perturbation set V can be constructed to
contain all the utility functions of the public sector of interest. In that case the SMU value
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of second objective function can be used as a measure of the public’s agreement relative to
the decision maker’s opinions.
Finally, ESM model can be used in group decision making problems, where the decision
maker has multiple advisors. In those cases the perturbation set V can be constructed to
contain the assessed utility functions of the advisors. Similar to social decision making
problems, in this scenarios the optimal solutions of ESM model will be maximally preferred
by the decision maker, corresponding to different relational values of agreement between
the advisors.
The derivative forms from section 3.2.2, allow to employ ESM model for hybrid prob-
lems concerning both preference ambiguity and group decision making. To illustrate this
feature, in the section 3.5.3 of the case study we solve a group decision making for the de-
cision maker who is being advised by two advisors. Unlike the approach suggested above,
the ESM model is still used to handle the preference ambiguity. However, the decision
maker is required to not only present a solution acceptable by advisors, but also to ensure
its approximate stability with regards to their preference ambiguity. In this case the prob-
lem was solved by linearly approximated SMU values of the advisors, using the Frechet
derivatives from section 3.2.2.
3.3.1 Risk-Aversion vs. Sensitivity-Aversion
The Von Neumann-Morgensetern theorem represents the decision maker’s risk prefer-
ence as a utility function. On this basis, Expected utility maximization hedges the risk
resulting from systemic randomness (Fishburn, 1979; Vickson & Ziemba, 2014). It is tra-
ditionally assumed that utility functions are deterministic and choice are consistent (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). However, these assumptions are persistently violated in
practice (see Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; H. Simon, 1955; Tversky, 1969, and others in the
references). Indeed, it is usually observed that the decision maker exhibits mutable and
ambivalent preference, particularly without sufficient knowledge of complex problems and
uncertain environment in the real world (Agranov & Ortoleva, 2017; Dean & Martin, 2016;
Echenique et al., 2011). The ambiguity in utility representation is also concomitant with
risk. The maximization of SMU, the second objective in ESM, provide a sensitivity-averse
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approach where the risk arising in the ambiguity is measured by SMU and controlled by its
maximization.
We now give a lottery selection example to illustrate difference between risk-aversion
and sensitivity-aversion. Let lottery X value $2 with probability of 0.8 and $0 with prob-




1− e−2 , θ ∈ [0, 2], (3.17)
and also give his alternative preference as
û(θ) =
1− e−2θ
1− e−4 , θ ∈ [0, 2]. (3.18)
Move u# towards û linearly and observe the changes on the level of risk-aversion and
sensitivity-aversion. Denote a directional function as
d(θ) := û(θ)− u#(θ), (3.19)
by which the linear movement can be expressed as
u(θ; δ) = u#(θ) + δd(θ), (3.20)
for some δ ∈ [0, 1]. The level of risk-aversion of u(θ; δ) is determined by the Arrow-Pratt
absolute risk-aversion coefficient is




The utility function û = u(.; 1) is more risk averse than u# = u(.; 0) since rd
u#
(θ, 1) = 3 >
rd
u#
(θ, 0) = 1.5 for all θ ∈ [0, 2]. The movement incurs increase in the level of risk-aversion






≥ 0, for all θ ∈ [0, 2]. (3.22)
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The change on the decision maker’s risk preference varies the selection of the lotteries X
and Y . X is preferred regarding u# since
E[u#(X)]− E[u#(Y )] = 0.8− 0.7311 = 0.0689, (3.23)
while Y is better regarding û, which is more risk averse, for
E[û(X)]− E[û(Y )] = 0.8− 0.8176 = −0.0176. (3.24)
We next observe the change of SMU in the movement. In this example, let the pertur-
bation set V consist of all risk-averse (increasing concave) functions. Letting the variation
h = δd, we have
E[h(X)− h(Y )] = δ(E[û(X)− u#(X)]− E[û(Y )− u#(Y )])
= −0.09δ < 0, for all δ ∈ (0, 1]. (3.25)






< 0. Hence, the level of sensitivity-
aversion decreases monotonically, which is opposite to the increase in risk-aversion. This
observation motives us to propose the bi-objective optimization model ESM for handling
the risks arsing in not only systemic randomness but also ambiguity of utility representa-
tion.
3.3.2 ε-Solution Method





subject to M[X̄(z) u# Ȳ ] ≥ ε,
z ∈ Z.
(ε-ESM)




E[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ )] (3.26)
subject to εmin
v∈V
E[v(X̄(z))− v(Ȳ )] + (1− ε)E[u#(X̄(z))− u#(Ȳ )] ≥ 0,
z ∈ Z.
Assume that model (ε-ESM) is feasible for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Let z∗(ε) is an optimal so-
lution of model (ε-ESM). Then the Pareto frontier of model ESM can be depicted by
(E[u#(X̄(z∗(ε)))], ε) varying ε from 0 to 1. Model (ε-ESM) with ε = 0 seeks the maximal
preference X̄(z) over Y with respect to u#, i.e., E[u#(X̄(z∗(0))) − u#(Ȳ )]. For the case
that 0 < ε < 1, we have
M[X̄(z∗(ε)) u# Ȳ ] = ε (3.27)
It follows by Proposition 4 that
(1− ε)E[u#(X̄(z∗(ε)))− u#(Ȳ )] = εE[vε(Ȳ )− vε(X̄(z∗(ε)))], (3.28)
where vε is the worst-case utility function over V as
vε := argminv∈V E[v(X̄(z
∗(ε)))− v(Ȳ )]. (3.29)
The quantity E[u#(X̄(z∗(ε))) − u#(Ȳ )] indicates the level of the preference of X̄(z∗(ε))
over Ȳ with respect to u#, while E[vε(Ȳ ) − vε(X̄(z∗(ε)))] shows how Ȳ is preferred to
X̄(z∗(ε)) in the worst case. In equation (3.28) the Pareto-efficient point requires to balance
these two preference relations using the weight ε. When ε = 1, Model (ε-ESM) finds
the maximum of the expected reference utility E[u#(X̄(z∗(1)))] under the condition that
X̄(z∗(1)) dominates Ȳ over the set V.
We next discuss model ESM under the assumption of the additive independence of
the attributes. Accordingly, all the utility functions in V, including the reference utility
function, should have additive forms (Abbas, 2018; Dyer, 2005). The reference utility
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where ωn’s are nonnegative trade-off weights satisfying
∑N
n=1 ωn = 1 and u
#
n ’s are marginal
reference utility functions. Also denote by Vn the set of the marginal utility functions re-
garding the nth attribute and by
Λ :=
{




λnān ≤ b̄, (λ1, . . . , λN) ≥ 0
}
(3.31)
a polyhedral set of trade-off weights among the attributes, where b̄ and ān’s are given







λnvn(θn), (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Λ, vn ∈ Vn
}
. (3.32)




E[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ )] (Σ-ESM)
subject to εb̄π̄ + (1− ε)E[u#(X̄(z))− u#(Ȳ )] ≥ 0,
ānπ̄ ≤ E[vn(Xn(z))− vn(Yn)], vn ∈ Vn, n = 1, . . . , N,
π̄ ≤ 0,
z ∈ Z.
Proof: By the definitions given in (3.30) and (3.32), we can rewrite the inner optimization

















λnān ≤ b̄ (3.33)
(λ1, . . . , λN) ≥ 0.
The model above is linear for (λ1, . . . , λN). Let π̄ be the vector of its dual variables.




subject to ānπ̄ ≤ E[vn(Xn(z))− vn(Yn)], vn ∈ Vn, n = 1, . . . , N
π̄ ≤ 0.
(3.34)
The proof is then complete by substituting the dual model for the inner optimization
problem in model (3.26).
3.4 Reformulations of Σ-ESM
With additively independent attributes, Proposition 5 represents model (Σ-ESM) as an
equivalent reformulation of (ε-ESM). Model (Σ-ESM) is a semi-infinite program specified
on the sets Vn of marginal utility functions. In this section we further develop solvable
reformulations of model (Σ-ESM).
3.4.1 Assumptions
We first describe the assumptions needed in this section. Let Θn := [θn,0, θn,Ln ] for
n = 1, . . . , N and Θ = Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn (the symbol ⊗ represents the Cartesian product) be
an bounded subset of RN . Since the normative decision maker prefers more to less, we let
the set Vn consist of all increasing utility functions normalized on Θn, i.e., vn(θn,0) = 0
and vn(θn,Ln) = 1 for all vn ∈ Vn. If the decision maker is risk-averse, we need to further
restrict Vn to the set of all increasing, concave, and continuous utility functions on Θn.
Assume that each marginal utility function u#n is a piece-wise linear function with a finite
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number of break points at θn,0 = ηn,0, ηn,1 . . . , ηn,Ln−1, ηn,Ln = θn,Ln , as follows:
u#n (θn) := 1−
Ln∑
l=1









ηn,l+1−ηn,l , if l = 1, . . . , Ln − 1.
(3.36)
This assumption does not lose generality, since the most used standard-gamble and paired-
gamble utility assessment methods, such as preference comparison, probability equiva-
lence, value equivalence, certainty equivalence, etc., yield piece-wise linear utility func-
tions (Farquhar, 1984).
We also assume that Ȳ and X̄(z) for any given z are discrete random vectors. Let
pk := P[X̄(z) = x̄k(z)], k = 1, . . . K, (3.37)
qt := P[Ȳ = ȳt], t = 1, . . . T, (3.38)
where x̄k(z) = (xk1(z), . . . , x
k
N(z)) and ȳ
t = (yt1, . . . , y
t
N) are the realizations of X̄(z) and
Ȳ . We separately sort the realizations of the nth component of Ȳ and the boundary points
of Θn, i.e., y
1
n, . . . , y
T
n , θn,0, and θn,Ln , in strictly ascending order as
θn,0 = y
(0)
n < · · · < y(Tn+1)n = θn,Ln , n = 1, . . . , N. (3.39)
Notice that Tn may be less than T since we combine equal numbers in the sorting. Accord-
ingly, the marginal probabilities of the sorted sequence are
q(t)n := P[Yn = y
(t)
n ], t = 0, . . . , Tn + 1. (3.40)
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3.4.2 MILP Reformulation for Preference Maximizing Decision Maker
We are now dedicate to the case with each set Vn consisting of all increasing utility
functions. This following theorem reformulates model (Σ-ESM) to be a mixed-integer
linear program.
THEOREM 6. Let Vn consist of all increasing utility functions normalized on Θn for
































αn,lE[(ηn,l − Yn)+], (3.41b)
xkn(z) + sn,k,l ≥ ηn,l, n = 1, . . . , N,
l = 1, . . . , Ln,






ψn,k,i + ānπ̄ ≤
t−1∑
i=0
q(i)n , n = 1, . . . , N,





y(t)n ψn,k,t ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N,
k = 1, . . . , K, (3.41e)
Tn+1∑
t=0
ψn,k,t = 1, n = 1, . . . , N,
k = 1, . . . , K (3.41f)
ψn,k,t ∈ {0, 1}, n = 1, . . . , N,
k = 1, . . . , K
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t = 0, . . . , Tn + 1
(3.41g)
sn,k,l ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N,
l = 1, . . . , Ln,
k = 1, . . . , K, (3.41h)
π̄ ≤ 0, (3.41i)
z ∈ Z. (3.41j)
To prove Theorem 6, we need to state the technical lemma which represents the equiva-
lent formulations of the problem minimizing the function Δ(Xn, Yn; vn) over the set of all
increasing utility functions.
LEMMA 1. For n = 1, . . . , N , let FXn and FYn be the CDFs of Xn and Yn. Then
min
vn∈Vn




n )− FXn(y(t)n −), (3.42)
where FXn(y−) = P[Xn < y].
Proof: For the sake of conciseness, we omit the subscript n in the proof. We first prove the
first equality in the theorem
min
v∈V
E[v(X)− v(Y )] = min
θ∈[θ0,θL]
FY (θ)− FX(θ). (3.43)
Recall that V consists of all increasing utility functions normalized on Θn. For any v ∈ V,
we have






















Observe, that for any θ ∈ [θ0, θL] exists t ∈ {1, . . . , T + 1} such that θ ∈ [y(t−1), y(t)).
Since FY is right continuous,
FY (θ) = FY (y
(t−1)). (3.45)
In addition, since FX is nondecreasing,








On the other hand, recall that y(0) = θ0 and y
(T+1) = θL are defined in (3.39). We have
FX(y
(0)) = FY (y
(0)) = 0 and FX(y
(T+1)) = FY (y
(T+1)) = 1. Thus FY (θ) − FX(θ) = 0

















For any t ∈ {0, . . . , T + 1}
FY (y














where the indicator function Id(y(t),θL](x) equals to 1 if x ∈ (y(t), θL] and 0 otherwise.







E[v(X)− v(Y )]. (3.50)

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The proof of Theorem 6.
We first give the mixed-integer linear formulation of the constraint ānπ̄ ≤ E[vn(Xn(z))−
vn(Yn)] for all vn ∈ Vn and n = 1, . . . , N , in model Σ-ESM, combining the results in
Lemma 1 with the formulation of the first order stochastic dominance constraint given in
Luedtke (2008). It follows by Lemma 1 that
ānπ̄ ≤ min
vn∈Vn




n )− FXn(z)(y(t)n −). (3.51)






n . Then the inequality
above is equivalent to
FXn(z)(y
(t)
n −) + ānπ̄ ≤
t−1∑
i=0
q(i)n , t = 1, . . . , Tn + 1. (3.52)
To calculate FXn(z)(y
(t)





n ≤ xkn(z) < y
(t+1)
n for t = 0, . . . Tn,
or if xkn(z) = y
(Tn+1)
n for t = Tn + 1
0, otherwise,
(3.53)




n if and only if∑t−1














(t)−) in inequality (3.52) we get (3.41d). The constraints (3.41e)-(3.41g)
are up to the definition of ψn,k,t.
We next substitute the piece-wise linear formulation (3.35) of u# into the objective
function E[u#(X̄(z))]−E[u#(Ȳ )] and the constraint εb̄π̄+(1−ε)E[u#(X̄(z))−u#(Ȳ )] ≥
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αn,lE[(ηn,l − Yn)+]. (3.56)
Furthermore, introducing the intermediate variables sIn,k,l to linearize (ηn,l−xkn(z))+ in the
two equations above, we have the objective (3.41a) and the constraints (3.41b), (3.41c),
and (3.41h). 
3.4.3 LP Reformulation for Risk-Averse Decision Maker
We now address model (Σ-ESM) for the decision maker who has risk averse attitude
towards random outcomes. In this section, we assume each set Vn consists of all increasing,
concave and continues marginal utility functions on Θn. The following theorem provides a
linear programming reformulation of model (Σ-ESM).
THEOREM 7. Let Vn consist of all increasing, concave and continues utility functions


















































n = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , Ln,
k = 1, . . . , K, (3.57d)
xkn(z) + s
II
n,k,t ≥ y(t)n ,
n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K,
t = 1, . . . , Tn + 1, (3.57e)
sIIn,k,t ≥ 0,
n = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , K,
t = 1, . . . , Tn + 1, (3.57f)
sIn,k,l ≥ 0,
n = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , Ln,
k = 1, . . . , K, (3.57g)
π̄ ≤ 0, (3.57h)
z ∈ Z. (3.57i)
To prove Theorem 7, we need to state the following technical lemma which represents
the equivalent formulations of the problem minimizing the function Δ(Xn, Yn; vn) over the
set of all increasing, concave, and continuous utility functions Vn.















Proof: For the sake of conciseness, we omit the subscript n in the proof without confusion.
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(θ − x)+ and
Δ(X̄, Ȳ ; v) := E[v(X̄)− v(Ȳ )].
(3.59)





is an increasing, con-




















































Δ(X, Y ; v).
(3.60)





(T+1) − θ0), if t = T + 1
v(y(t))−v(y(t−1))
y(t)−y(t−1) (y
(t) − θ0)− v(y
(t+1))−v(y(t))
y(t+1)−y(t) (y













Let us compare v and vT . Since v is an increasing concave function, v(x) ≥ vT (x) for all
x ∈ Θ and v(y(t)) = vT (y(t)) for t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Therefore, E[v(X)] ≥ E[vT (X)] and
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E[v(Y )] ≥ E[vT (Y )]. Using these results we have





































The proof of Theorem 7.
We first linearize the constraints ānπ̄ ≤ E[v(Xn(z)) − vn(Yn)] for vn ∈ Vn and n =











E[(y(t)n − Yn)+]− E[(y(t)n −Xn(z))+]
)
. (3.64)
Introducing the intermediate variables sIIn,k,t ≥ 0, we linearize (y
(t)
n − Xn(z))+ to obtain
(3.57c), (3.57e), and (3.57f).
We next substitute the piece-wise linear formulation (3.35) of u# into the objective



































αn,lE[(ηn,l − Yn)+]. (3.66)
Furthermore, introducing the intermediate variables sIn,k,l to linearize (ηn,l−xkn(z))+ in the
two equations above, we have the objective (3.57a) and the constraints (3.57b), (3.57d),
and (3.57g). 
3.5 Case Study: Homeland Security Budget Allocation
In this section we apply ESM model to the budget allocation optimization problem
described in Hu et al. (2011). The study is about the budget allocation to urban areas in the
United States under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) for prevention, response,
and recovery from national catastrophes and terrorist attacks. The total budget under this
initiative for 2009 was $799,000,000. This budget was allocated to 62 urban areas, with
60% of the money allocated to the 10 highest risk urban areas (see Table 3.1). The goal is
to find such an allocation vector z, which is at least as preferred by the decision maker as
the average government allocation for 2005-2009 years, presented as a benchmark zGov in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Budget Allocation Benchmark
Urban Area Id
(denoted with g)
Urban Area Avg. of government
allocations (zGov)
1 New York 31.93
2 Chicago 10.42
3 Bay Area 6.83
4 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 12.94
5 Los Angeles-Long Beach 15.24
6 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 4.19





Logically, the site’s budget share shall be calculated proportional to its vulnerability
relative to other sites. Since the national catastrophes and terrorist attacks usually have
unpredictable nature and multiple targets (i.e., the same site can have very protected in-
frastructure, but at the same time it can be vulnerable to attacks on pedestrians), the site’s
vulnerability usually is computed using multiple measures (indicators), which have random
nature. Following Hu et al. (2011), the urban sites are enumerated from 1 to 10, we denote
the site’s id number with g (see Table 3.1). Each g-th site’s share is computed proportional
to four vulnerability indicators measuring shares of risks of having (i) property losses (Cg1 ),
(ii) fatalities (Cg2 ), (iii) air traffic losses (C
g
3 ) and (iv) average daily bridge traffic losses
(Cg4 ). For example, C
2
2 = 0.2 will mean that in the total risk of having fatalities during a
national catastrophic or terrorist attack Chicago’s share is 20%. For the sake of conciseness
we refer to these indicators as the g site’s ”vulnerability risk-share”-s. To incorporate the
random nature of terrors attacks, vulnerability risk-shares are calculated using historical
data and are treated as random variables with distributions specific to them.
Due to their nature, different sites are vulnerable to different aspects, which means
that usually it is impossible to find an allocation with shares proportional to all of the
vulnerability risk-shares for all sites. Thus, if Chicago’s budget share z2 is less than the
value of vulnerability risk-share C23 of having air traffic losses, then the C
2
3 − z2 difference
is the missing budget share necessary to recover from the attack on air traffic. This missing
budget share is called the budget’s ”missallocation” for air traffic losses in Chicago -
X23 (z) := −(C23 − z2)+. (3.67)
Following (Hu et al., 2011; Willis et al., 2005), the total missallocation for any vulnerability





This measure of missallocation is called negative semi-deviation and is widely used in
budget management. Since for each site we have four vulnerability risk-shares, in this study
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we will have four missallocation attributes calculated according the formula (3.68) for each
vulnerability. Combining them gives us the vector of the overall budget missallocation
X̄(z) = (X1(z), X2(z), X3(z), X4(z)) . (3.69)
We measure the preference of an budget allocation z for a decision maker with refer-
ence utility function u#, as the expected utility of this missallocation vector, denoted as
E[u#(X̄(z))]. Since the goal is to find an allocation policy at least as preferred as the aver-
age of previous allocations, we get our first objective function in Model 1 by maximizing
the budget allocation’s preference with regards to zGov benchmark from the point of view
of given decision maker. For the sake of coherence with the theory, we denote the missal-
location vector produced by zGov as Ȳ Gov (i.e. Ȳ Gov := X̄(zGov)). Thus, in this case study
for the decision maker with the reference utility function u# the first objective function has
the following form
maxE[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ Gov)]. (3.70)
On the other hand, the decision maker can find the optimal allocation of this initial prob-
lem not-preferable to zGov due to problems arising from risk sources (Chl 2) and (Chl 2).
Then, in the best scenario he will need to reconstruct his utility function again and solve the
optimization problem again. In the worst case, he may need to do reallocation of already
implemented budget between the urban areas. To avoid possible reallocations of the bud-
get, we pair decision maker’s allocation preference maximization with the maximization of
his preference stability, represented with the second objective function in Model 1.
max E[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ Gov)]
max M[X̄(z) u# Ȳ Gov],
s.t. ‖z‖1 = 1,
z ≥ 0,
(Model 1)
where Ȳ Gov = X̄(zGov) represents the missallocation vector of the benchmark zGov. The
Model 1 is an application of the theoretical ESM model presented in the section 3.3. In
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this study we will solve it using linear ε-reformulation model (3.57) described in section
3.4.3 for a risk averse decision makers. We will investigate Model 1’s efficient frontier,
corresponding Pareto-optimal solutions, and the effects of various parameters in it.
3.5.1 Problem Setup
The solution method of Model 1 for a risk-averse decision maker was presented in the
model (3.57) in subsection 3.4.3. Following the necessary constructions described in the






4(z)), k = 1, . . . , 400 dis-
crete realizations of the overall budget missallocation vector (X̄(z)). In the Appendix A
we show that the sample size of 400 is enough for the results of Model 1 to not be affected
by any more samples. Since X̄(z)’s each element is calculated from all urban areas’ vul-
nerability indicators (see eq. (3.68)), we select {(cg,k1 , cg,k2 , cg,k3 , cg,k4 ), g = 1, . . . , 10}, k =
1, . . . , 400 i.i.d samples from {(Cg1 , Cg2 , Cg3 , Cg4 ), g = 1, . . . , 10} group of all 10 urban
areas vulnerability risk-share vectors.
The probability distributions of the risk-share vector elements are considered to be
based on information about foreign terrorist organizations, domestic threat groups and dif-
ferent beliefs about the terrorist motivations and capabilities (see Hu et al., 2011, for in
detail construction of the probability distributions).
From the selected samples then the elements of discrete realization x̄k(z) are con-




(cg,kn − zn)+, n = 1, . . . , 4. (3.71)
We treat this sample outcomes as equally likely, thus in our case the probability of those
realization will be







Since in our problem the Y Gov benchmark is the budget missallocations from the average
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of previous allocation policies, it will also have T = 400 discrete realizations







Aggregation Weights Set Generation.
In order to use model (3.57) we first must specify matrix A and vector b̄ for the wight
region Λ. Following the case study in Hu et al. (2011), we chose the set Λ to be the convex
hull of 4 vertexes
(0.25 + γr, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3),
(0.25− γr/3, 0.25 + γr, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3),
(0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25 + γr, 0.25− γr/3),
(0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25− γr/3, 0.25 + γr). (3.74)
This convex hull is a polytope with circumradius of 2γr/
√
3 and circumcenter of (0.25, 0.25,
0.25, 0.25). In Hu et al. (2011) this set is called Equality-Centered as it does not produce
bias towards any specific aspect’s perturbation. By changing the parameter γr we can con-
trol the size of the set Λ, thus we will refer to it as a radius. In order to avoid negative
weights γr is defined to be from [0, 0.75]. The parameters A and b̄ are generated from
here using facet enumeration algorithm for bounded convex polytopes. Following Hu et
al. (2011), we select weight region radius of γr = 0.15 as default. But in section 3.5.2 we
discuss its effect on the solutions of Model 1.
Parameter Sets.
To finalize the problem setup we present below the parameter cases which we study in
this chapter (see Table 3.2).
Case (i) is considered the default one. In this configuration the benchmark is selected
to be the missallocation Y Gov produced by the average of government allocations for 2005-
2009 years zGov (see Table 3.1). We pair this benchmark with an unbiased decision maker.
For the sake of exposition, let the decision maker be named Eric, with a reference utility
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Table 3.2: Configurations in Four Studied Cases
Reference utility Benchmark
Case (i) u#e Y
Gov
Case (ii) u#i Y
Gov
Case (iii) u#p Y
Gov








1− e . (3.75)
The utility function u#e is a weighted sum of the same exponential utility function, which
describe a risk-averse attitudes towards the corresponding budget missallocation attributes.
Those exponential functions are well known to have constant absolute risk aversion coef-
ficient of 1 (CARA utility functions). Additionally, the aggregation weights in his utility
function are all equal to 0.25, thus no bias is introduced towards any missallocation at-
tribute. We use this configuration of Model 1 in section 3.5.2, where we discuss the main
features of Pareto-optimal frontier and solutions. We also used this configuration in ap-
pendix A for the computational analysis of the Model 1 and the selection of the appropriate
sample size of input data.
Case (ii) and (iii) are dedicated to investigation of results of Model 1 for decision makers
with different preferences. In the section 3.5.3 the Model 1 is solved for two additional
decision makers (hereby named as Irvin and Paula). Unlike Eric, Irvin is selected to value
missallocations in infrastructure attributes (X3(z) and X4(z)) more then in other areas.
While Paula is selected to have opposite views, valuing more the private property (X1(z))
and fatality (X2(z)) attributes (See Table 3.3). Additionally, we discuss the situation of
conflicting suggestions, where Irvin and Paula are acting as advisors of Eric. We investigate
the effect of those suggestions on the results of Model 1 solved for Eric.
Case (iv) is dedicated to investigation of the effects of different benchmarks on Model 1.
In their study Willis et al. (2005) suggest an allocation which is known to have a significant
disagreement with zGov. In section 3.5.4 we use both of this allocations as benchmarks in
Model 1 for an unbiased decision maker (Eric). We investigate the point of divergence,
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the most stable solutions with regards to preference ambiguity and other properties of the
results.
Table 3.3: Eric’s, Irvin’s and Paula’s Reference Utility Functions
Eric u#e (x̄) Irvin u
#




Weight (ω1) 0.25 0.1 0.4
Util.Fun. (u#1 ) (e
−x1 − e)/(1− e) (e−x1 − e)/(1− e) (e−4x1 − e4)/(1− e4)
Fatalities
Weight (ω2) 0.25 0.1 0.4
Util.Fun. (u#2 ) (e
−x2 − e)/(1− e) (e−x2 − e)/(1− e) (e−4x2 − e4)/(1− e4)
Air Departures
Weight (ω3) 0.25 0.4 0.1
Util.Fun. (u#3 ) (e
−x3 − e)/(1− e) (e−4x3 − e4)/(1− e4) (e−x3 − e)/(1− e)
Avg. daily bridge traffic
Weight (ω4) 0.25 0.4 0.1
Util.Fun. (u#4 ) (e
−x4 − e)/(1− e) (e−4x4 − e4)/(1− e4) (e−x4 − e)/(1− e)
3.5.2 Results of Base Case
In this subsection we investigate the results of Model 1 with default parameter config-
uration described in Table 3.2 as Case (i). Figure 3.1a present the efficient frontier of the
Model 1 and figure 3.1b contains the corresponding Pareto-optimal solutions.
(a) Efficient Frontier (b) Optimal solution
Figure 3.1: Results of Model 1 With Default Parameter Set.
The efficient frontier has characteristic shape of a decreasing curve, due to the con-
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flicting nature of objective function in Model 1. To reach increasingly stable solutions
with regards to preference ambiguity, SMU measure requires Model 1 to produce solu-
tions which are preferable by increasing amount of new utility functions. Thus, obviously,
shrinking the set of feasible solutions. This shrunken set may not contain solutions which
Eric prefers the most anymore, decreasing his preference of new optimal solution.
The efficient frontier starts at SMU value of 0.4, which corresponds to the sensitiv-
ity level of the initial solution picked with consideration of only Eric’s reference utility
function u#e . The solutions for SMU values of 0 to 0.4 are equal to the initial optimal
values (thus are not depicted in Pareto-optimal solution set in figure 3.1b). In all of them
the biggest share is the New York urban area’s with 44.35%, followed by Chicago with
13.08%. Eric’s preference of this initial solution is 0.03.
On figure 3.1a, as we move right on efficient frontier passed the (0.4, 0.03) point, the
corresponding solutions solutions start to change. Due to consideration of more utility
functions in the perturbation set in the SMU the share of New York urban area is steadily
decreasing from 44.35% to 34.17%. Which is reached at SMU value of 1. At this point
the solution is the most stable with regards to preference ambiguity and will be preferred
to benchmark Y Gov by any risk-averse decision maker from the perturbation set. Unfor-
tunately, it also means that in this solution the missallocation attributes are required to be
preferable to the corresponding attributes in Y Gov benchmark by risk-averse utility function
describing hypothetical decision makers with rather inhumane risk attitudes. The consid-
eration of such risk-attitudes was the main challenge which in chapter 2 we tried to solve.
Other than the reference utility function, benchmark and attribute-wise core traits en-
coded in the perturbation region, the only parameter affecting Model 1 results is the aggre-
gation weight region. Since we do not want to introduce any bias between the attributes,
the only parameter controlling aggregation weight region is its radius- γr. In the base case
it is selected to have value of 0.15. To see how does the aggregation weight region size
affect the optimal solutions we have applied Model 1 for Eric with different values of γr
weight region radius. The figure 3.2 presents the Pareto-optimal solution sets for γr values
of 0, 0.15, 0.4 and 0.75.
In all three figures the solutions start from Eric’s most preferred allocation and reach
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(a) Optimal Solutions for γr = 0. (b) Optimal Solutions for γr = 0.15.
(c) Optimal Solutions for γr = 0.4. (d) Optimal Solutions for γr = 0.75.
Figure 3.2: Impact of Perturbation Size on Optimal Asset Allocations.
the SMU value of 1, converging to the same values - Eric’s most stable solution with re-
gards to preference ambiguity (see figure 3.1b). In general case this effect may not appear
as with the increase of weight region, we increase the considered utility functions in the
perturbation set. Thus in general sense, the increase of weight region may cause the most
stable solutions with regards to preference ambiguity to be different.
On the other hand, the comparison of figures 3.2a-3.2d reveals more general, negative
relationship of the aggregation weight region radius γr and the SMU level of Eric’s most
preferred initial solution. The conflict in this relationship is explained with the nature
of weight region. As the weight region increases in size (i.e. as γr is increased), the
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number of aggregated utility functions used in SMU measure increases as well. This results
in introduction of additional constraints on a feasible solutions. Those constraints shrink
the feasibility region of the solutions, which may not contain the initial optimal solution
anymore. Thus resulting in lower SMU level for that solution in the efficient frontier of
Model 1.
Returning to the observation of Eric’s efficient frontier in figure 3.1a, one can observe
that it is almost flat. The difference of preference values between the most and least stable
allocations with regards to preference ambiguity is only 0.007. This means that the missal-
locations from average of government solutions zGov and the solution from Eric’s reference
utility function u#e are very close. Thus u
#
e unbiased reference utility function can be used
to describe an government’s average allocation preference. This observation was one of
the reasons we picked u#e as a default reference utility function in this study. In the next
subsection we compare it with the other functions described in Table 3.3.
But how to pick a solution? When given the efficient frontier and corresponding
solution (see figure 3.1), it is natural to ask: Which solution Eric must pick?
It is obvious that Eric shall pick solutions which are not corresponding to endpoints on
the efficient frontier. As the solution corresponding to the first point will usually be highly
sensitive with regards to preference ambiguity, while the last point will usually be very
conservative.
In budget allocation problems, such as one considered in this case study, the decision
maker usually is advised to pick a solution within a given variation tolerance when com-
pared to the most stable solution with regards to preference ambiguity. For example, sup-
pose that Eric can have ±5% maximum variation between the corresponding shares of the
same urban area in the most stable allocation with regards to preference ambiguity and the
allocation he picked. Then, he shall start from the allocation corresponding to SMU value
of 1 and move left on SMU level axis reducing its value. He shall stop when the maximum
difference between the new allocation and the allocation corresponding to SMU value of
1 on some urban area becomes larger than 5%. With this technique, for this case, Eric
must pick the allocation corresponding to SMU level of 0.7. At this point the New York’s
share is 38.22%, which is already 4.05% higher than 34.16% in the most stable allocation
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with regards to preference ambiguity. With ±5% restriction Eric cannot chose allocation at
SMU level of 0.6, as at that point the difference for the New York’s shares already increases
to 6.5%.
3.5.3 Impact of Reference Utility Function
We now investigate cases (ii) and (iii) to analyze the effect of decision maker’s reference
utility function on the results of Model 1. For this sake we select two additional decision
makers- Irvin and Paula, and solve the Model 1 for them individually.
Irvin is selected to value missallocations in infrastructure attributes (X3(z) and X4(z))
more then in other areas. Accordingly, in his reference utility function u#i the missalloca-
tion utilities corresponding to air departures and average daily bridge traffic attributes have
higher weights of 0.4 and Arrow and Pratt’s risk-aversion coefficients of 4. Additionally,
the missallocation utilities corresponding to private property losses and fatalities have lower
weights of 0.1 and risk-aversion coefficients of 1 (See Table 3.3). On the other hand, Paula
is represented as a complete opposite to Irvin, valuing missallocations in private property
(X1(z)) and fatalities (X2(z)) more then in infrastructure attributes. Correspondingly, her
reference utility function (u#p ) in Table 3.3 has mirrored to Irvin weights and risk-aversion
coefficients.
The figure 3.3 presents the Pareto-efficient frontiers and optimal solutions for Paula,
Irvin and Eric generated by Model 1. The efficient frontiers in the figures 3.3d and 3.3f are
characteristically decreasing as the personally preferable solutions of Irvin and Paula are
being asked to become acceptable for wider set of utility functions.
For Paula the efficient frontier starts at SMU value of 0.5. At this point the correspond-
ing optimal solution is the most preferable by her with the allocation preference of 0.17
with regards to Y Gov benchmark. And compared to Eric and Irvin, Paula’s personal solu-
tion is more stable with regards to preference ambiguity as their most preferable solutions
start at SMU value of 0.4 and 0.3 respectively. The solution from figure 3.3a correspond-
ing to this point of (0.5, 0.17) in the efficient frontier allocates 61.7% to New York urban
area. This allocation is followed by Chicago comprising 13.7% of the budget. Thus, com-
pared to Eric’s initial solution, Paula’s contains increased allocations only for New York
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(a) Optimal Solutions for
Paula.
(b) Optimal Solutions for
Eric.
(c) Optimal Solutions for
Irvin.
(d) Efficient Frontier for
Paula.
(e) Efficient Frontier for Eric. (f) Efficient Frontier for Irvin.
Figure 3.3: Impact of Inconsistency on Optimal Asset Allocations.
(39% increase) and Chicago (4.8% increase) urban areas, in the expense of others. Notably
Newark, NJ with -86.6%, Seattle-Bellevue-Everett with -71.4% and Huston -68.3% urban
areas share reductions. Those changes are completely expected based on Paula’s values
depicted in her reference utility function u#p in Table 3.3. As she values the missallocations
on private property and population losses more then other attributes, it is only natural for
her solution to allocate significant portions of the budget to densely populated urban areas
with high population.
As the SMU value in the efficient frontier is increased beyond 0.5, Paula’s preference of
solution drops fast from its initial value of 0.17 to 0.03. The drop speed indicates that Paula
has strong preference towards her initial solution, but it is in conflict with the new risk-
averse utility functions in the perturbation set. The decrease in Paula’s preference values
and the changes in the Pareto-optimal solutions can be traced up to the SMU value of 1. At
this point solution is the most stable with regards to preference ambiguity, preferred by all
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possible risk-averse decision maker’s described by the utility functions in the perturbation
set. The solution allocates 34.6% to New York and 13.9% to Chicago. It is interesting to
observe that LA-Long Beach urban area’s budget share is increased from 4.1% to 11.2%,
which is the highest increase, followed by Newark, NJ rising from 0.9% to 7.5%. Compared
to Eric’s the most sable solution with regards to his preference ambiguity, Paula’s most
sable allocation with regards to her preference ambiguity differs in a very small amount.
The Euclidean distance between solutions is only 3% and the maximal difference is 3.1%
for Houston urban area.
Let us now observe the figures 3.3f and 3.3c depicting the efficient frontier and Pareto-
optimal solutions for Irvin generated by Model 1. The efficient frontier starts at (0.3, 0.07).
At this point the solution is the most preferred one by Irvin, with allocation preference of
0.07. This solution allocates the budget in a relatively even manner. The highest allocation
share is still New York urban area’s (18.3%), followed by Chicago (12.6%) and LA-Long
Beach (11.4%). Unlike Paula and Eric, Irvin’s initial solution allocates 10.8% budget share
to Boston (Paula does 2.7% and Eric 3.8%), MA-NH and 9.6% to Houston (Paula does
1.7% and Eric 5.3%) urban areas. This allocations are characteristic to decision maker like
Irvin, and can be expected based on their reference utility function features. In the case of
Irvin, in his reference utility function u#i in Table 3.3 indicates that he values the critical
infrastructure of the urban area more then the other attributes.
As the value of SMU is increased in the efficient frontier Irvin’s preference of the solu-
tions drops from 0.07 to 0.03. This drop although is not as steep as in Paula’s case, but still
is noticeable compared to Eric. Unlike the Eric and Paula, in the corresponding solutions
the New York’s share is increasing (from 18.3% to 31.9%). Finally, at SMU value of 1,
solution becomes the most stable with regards to preference ambiguity, preferred to Y Gov
benchmark by all risk-averse utility functions in the perturbation set. The Euclidean dis-
tance between Irvin’s and Eric’s most stable solutions with regards to preference ambiguity
is 5.6% and the maximal difference is 18.8% for Boston, MA-NH urban area.
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Targeted Sensitivity Analysis.
Let us assume that Irvin and Paula are selected to advise Eric in picking an appropriate
solution. From Figure 3.3 we observe that Pareto-optimal solutions of Model 1 for Eric,
Irvin and Paula are very different from each other. As Irvin and Paula are advisors of
Eric, it is natural for him to investigate how the sensitivity of an allocation z∗ he picked
from his Pareto-optimal solutions will change for Irvin and Paula. That change can be
described by Frechet derivative of the second objective value in the Model 1 with respect
to Erick’s reference utility function on the direction pointing towards Irvin’s or Paula’s
reference utility functions. We have picked di and dp unit directions pointing towards
Irvin’s (u#i ) and Paula’s (u
#
p ) reference utility functions, correspondingly:
di(x) =
u#i (x)− u#e (x)
‖u#i − u#e ‖L2
and dp(x) =
u#p (x)− u#e (x)
‖u#p − u#e ‖L2
. (3.76)
Using this directions in the equations (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13), we can use the corre-
sponding Frechet derivatives to calculate linearly approximated values of SMU measure
for Paula and Irvin. The table 3.4 presents those approximations and Frechet derivative
values for four points, selected from Eric’s efficient frontier (See Table 3.4).
In the table 3.4, solutions z∗1-z
∗
4 are selected from Eric’s Pareto-optimal solutions of
Model 1. The z∗1 is the most sensitive solution with regards to preference ambiguity cor-
responding to point with SMU value of 0.4 on his efficient frontier (see figure 3.1). On
the other hand, z∗4 is the most stable solution with regards to preference ambiguity corre-
sponding to point with SMU value of 1. Without loss of generality, we have chosen z∗2 and
z∗3 Pareto-optimal solutions to correspond to points on Eric’s efficient frontier with equally
spaced 0.6 and 0.8 values of SMU.
From table 3.4, we can observe that solution z∗1 has 0.4 SMU value for Eric and ap-
proximately 0.7 for Paula. However it is approximated to be very unstable with regards to
preference ambiguity for Irvin with SMU value of 0. As we move from z∗1 to z
∗
4 , we can
observe that the solutions are approximated to become more stable with regards to pref-
erence ambiguity for Paula and Irvin. This effect is expected as the more stable solutions
regards to preference ambiguity are required to stay preferable for a utility function from
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Table 3.4: Approximate SMU Levels and Frechet Derivatives on Directions Pointing to
Irvin’s and Paula’s Reference Utility Functions







New York 44.35 40.7 36.52 34.17
Chicago 13.08 13.32 13.7 13.78
Bay Area 6.94 7.43 7.96 8.42
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 6.56 6.74 7.03 7.31
Los Angeles-Long Beach 6.42 7.66 8.92 9.5
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 3.43 3.59 3.86 3.97
Boston, MA-NH 3.85 3.98 4.17 4.28
Houston 5.30 5.98 6.85 7.18
Newark, NJ 7 7.34 7.56 7.85
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 3.08 3.25 3.43 3.53
Erick’s Allocation Preference 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Erick’s Allocation SMU Level 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Irvin’s Allocation Preference 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Irvin’s Allocation’s Approx SMU Level 0 0.21 0.66 1
Paula’s Allocation Preference 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02




















(change Eric → Irvin) -118.62 -85.28 -31.59 0




) 7.61 7.90 5.97 0
wider perturbation sets.
Interestingly, we can observe that the solution z∗4 is approximated to have SMU values
of 1 for both Irvin and Paula. It must be noted, that this does not mean that it is the most
optimal stable solution for both of them. However, since Paula and Irvin share the same
perturbation area as Eric (i.e. they all are risk-averse), we can claim that z∗4 will have SMU
value of 1 for all of them and is one of the candidates of the most optimal stable solution
with regards to corresponding preference ambiguities.
On the other hand, we can observe that z∗4 is also the most disliked version by all three
decision makers. We argue that for this kind of situations the solution z∗3 maybe allocation
80
Eric would like to choose, as it is approximated to be preferable by all three decision
makers, while also having decent SMU values for all of them.
The table 3.4 also highlights the conflict between Irvin’s and Paula’s risk preferences.
As we see for the same solutions their approximate sensitivity levels are always opposing
to each other. For any solution Irvin’s SMU levels are lower and Paula’s are higher then
Eric’s. This is due their values depicted in their reference utility functions, as they are
selected to be compete opposite to each other. Their conflict in values is probably best
presented in comparison of the corresponding Frechet derivatives. As one can observe,
all of the corresponding derivatives are opposite numbers. The derivative values towards












are positives, while values













It is also interesting to observe that for any given allocation z∗ the ratio between values
of Frechet derivatives of allocation and SMU measure does not change for Irvin and Paula.




derivative from the equation (3.12), indi-
cating the ratio of change between the first and the second objective functions in the Model
1. The stability of this ratio is due to symmetry in Irvin’s and Paula’s risk-attitudes with
regards to Eric.
3.5.4 Impact of the Benchmark
In the allocation problems, it is typical for the decision makers to have a bottom-line
policy with which the optimal solutions are compared. In the theoretical ESM model their
outcomes are refereed as benchmarks. By default, in this case study the ESM model was
configured with
zGov = (31.93%, 10.42%, 6.83%, 12.94%, 15.24%, 4.19%, 3.74%, 5.88%, 6.6%, 2.24%)
allocation and corresponding to it Ȳ Gov missallocation benchmark (see Table 3.1 and Model
1). In this section we study the Case (iv) from configuration table 3.2, where we change
the zGov allocation to
zRand := (58.61%, 16.39%, 7.91%, 5.06%, 4.95%, 2.42%, 2.11%, 1.21%, 0.66%, 0.67%).
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This allocation was suggested by RAND Corporation in the (Willis et al., 2005) for the
same time period. As one can observe, this benchmarks are vastly different. The biggest
difference is in the share of New York urban area, which is 58.61% - 31.93% = 26.68%
of the budget, amounting to $2.364 billion over 5 years. The average difference is 6.74%
of the budget. Denote the outcome produced by zRand as Ȳ Rand = X̄(zRand). With this
benchmark the ESM model will have following form
max E[u#(X̄(z))]− E[u#(Ȳ Rand)]
max M[X̄(z) u# Ȳ Rand],
s.t. ‖z‖1 = 1,
z ≥ 0,
(Model 2)
In the ESM model, the optimal solutions are required to be more or equally preferable
to the benchmark. Therefore different benchmarks will generate different feasible solutions
sets. Since
X̄(zGov) u# X̄(zGov) = Ȳ Gov and
X̄(zRand) u# X̄(zRand) = Ȳ Rand,
(3.77)
the benchmarks themselves are always members of feasibility sets of Model 1 and Model
2, respectively.
Interestingly, Eric’s the most preferred allocation in Model 1 is also his the most pre-
ferred allocation in the Model 2. Since it is his initial most sensitive to preference ambiguity
allocation we denote to it as
z∗sensitive = (44.4%, 13.08%, 6.94%, 6.56%, 6.42%, 3.43%, 3.85%, 5.3%, 7.0%, 3.08%).
This allocation is almost equally distanced from zGov and zRand benchmark allocations,
with 16.78% and 16.92% Euclidean distances, respectively. Major differences are in the
share of New York urban area, with 12.41% increase compared to zGov and 14.27% de-
crease compared to zRand. The z∗sensitive allocation preference with regards to z
Gov is equal
to 0.0315, while with regards to zRand is equal to 0.0334. Thus, we can conclude that
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Eric prefers zGov to zRand. This preference can also be observed in starting solutions on
corresponding efficient frontiers in figure 3.4a.
(a) Efficient Frontiers. (b) Optimal New York Share. (c) Euclidean Distance Between
Optimal and Benchmark Alloca-
tions
Figure 3.4: Results of Model 1 and Model 2 for zGov and zRand Benchmark Allocations.
With the increase of SMU value the feasibility set of ESM models shrink. Since the
benchmark allocations are in the those sets, this means that optimal solutions become more
and more similar to them. This effect can be clearly observed in figure 3.4c, depicting
the monotonically decreasing euclidean distances between the optimal solutions and cor-
responding benchmark allocations in Model 1 and Model 2. Observe, that the distance
between optimal solutions and zRand allocation benchmarks in Model 2 decrease much
faster, than the distance between optimal solutions and zGov in Model 1. This is combined
effect of Eric’s preference characteristics encoded in his reference utility function and the
shrinkage of the feasibility set. Apparently, in the feasibility set of Model 1 preferred by
Eric solutions are located relatively far from zGov, than ones in the feasibility set of Model
2 with regards to zRand.
It is interesting to observe completely opposite optimal policies in the solutions of
Model 1 and Model 2 for the same decision maker. This effect is caused by the difference in
feasibility sets of those models due to different benchmark policies. The most striking dif-
ferences can be found in the share of New York urban area (see figure 3.4b). Even though,
the initial solutions are the same, the increase of SMU value causes a monotonic decrease
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and a monotonic increase in the shares of New York urban area in the Model 1 and Model
2, respectively. At the solution corresponding to SMU value of 1, in the Model 1 the New
York’s share is decreased by 10.18%, while in the Model 2 it is increased by 13.17%. The
overall euclidean distance of those solutions have increased from initial 0 to 25.63%.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the sensitivity of stochastic optimization models with
regards to the preference ambiguity in the decision maker’s utility function. We have started
with the study and analysis of decision maker’s preference ambiguity. Isolating studies
where the solutions of stochastic optimization models were registered to be sensitivity with
regards to preference ambiguities.
To measure this sensitivity we have chosen a special sensitivity measure of a preference
relation with regards to preference ambiguity — SMU. We have studied its boundary values
and other properties from the utilitarian point of view. Classically the sensitivity analysis
is considered in the post-optimality step. Which forces to re-solve the optimization mod-
els iteratively, until the satisfactory results are found. In this study, we have incorporated
the SMU sensitivity measure in the optimization model itself. This step ensures, that the
produced solutions are maximally stable with regards to decision maker’s preference am-
biguity.
To preserve the decision maker’s individualism. We have incorporated expected util-
ity maximization in the same optimization model. Allowing to ensure the optimality of
the solutions from the point of view of classical risk-averse, preference maximization. We
have named the constructed bi-objective optimization model incorporating preference max-
imization and sensitivity analysis on decision maker’s preference ambiguity — ESM. And
presented two solution methods for it, using linearization techniques. For the preference
maximizer decision maker we have presented mixed integer programming model equiva-
lent to ESM. And for a risk-averse decision makers we have presented linear programming
model equivalent to ESM.
Finally, we have applied the ESM model for the budget allocation to ten major urban
areas in the United States under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). We study the
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various solutions of the problem for different decision makers. Compare their allocation
policies to the government’s average allocation and to the allocation suggested by RAND
corporation.
We have employed the closed form results for the Frechet derivative of the SMU sensi-
tivity measure to conduct a group decision making analysis for a group of different decision
makers. Employed targeted sensitivity analysis allowed to find a solution which was ex-
pected to suit all of the members of the group with an acceptable sensitivity values.
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Appendix A
Computational Analysis of Model 1 from Chapter 3
All tests are conducted on a machine with Intel Core i7 3rd Gen processor with 4
physical cores and hyper-threading on each core. The maximum frequency is 2.4 GHz
with the boost at specific core up to 3.2GHz. The maximum amount of RAM allowed for
computations is 12 GB in total. The Model 1 model is solved in CPLEX Studio 12.6 in
OPL language, with CPLEX barrier algorithm in deterministic parallel mode.
(a) Optimal value (b) Optimal solution
Figure A.1: Computational Results of Model 1 for zGov Benchmark Allocation.
We solve the Model 1 model with the default parameter set (case (i)) from Table 3.2
while changing the sample size K from 50 to 800. The step size is selected to be 50 sam-
ples. The figure A.1 represents the results for the default parameter set for zGov government
benchmark. At the sample sizes 50, 100 and 200 we can observe fluctuations in the opti-
mal missallocation in figure A.1a and in the optimal solutions A.1b. This is clear indication
that those sample sizes are not enough and cannot represent the whole population of possi-
ble values of {(Cg1 , Cg2 , Cg3 , Cg4 ), g = 1, . . . , 10} group of all 10 urban areas valnurability
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risk-share vectors. However, starting from sample size 200 the fluctuations in the solutions
decrease and after 400 the difference in the optimal solution are negligible. We observed
similar behaviors with all the other parameter sets, including the case where we did con-
sider Rand benchmark. This behavior indicates that the sample size of 400 is big enough
the represent the whole population of possible values of {(Cg1 , Cg2 , Cg3 , Cg4 ), g = 1, . . . , 10}
group and new samples do not bring new effects on the results.
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